The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Saddam
preparing a bolt hole. But we should be working assiduously on
trying to
weaken his
regime from within.”18
49.
Mr Blair
also set out concerns about the risks from WMD more
generally:
“The true
criticism of us is not that we are doing Iraq; but that we are only
doing Iraq.
I agree
with DM [David Manning], this needs to form a major part of our
agenda with
the US. I
want the next bilateral meeting … with the US to draw up an agenda
for
action
across a range of fronts … the timing is right, i.e. not just on
terrorism but on
WMD; MEPP
and the Arab world; climate change; WTO [World Trade
Organization].
We need to
be articulating a strong world vision.”
50.
The note was
also sent to Sir Andrew Turnbull, the Cabinet Secretary,
Dr John Reid,
the
Minister without Portfolio and Labour Party Chair, and
Mr Douglas Alexander, the
Minister of
State (Cabinet Office).
51.
The MOD
reported on 19 November that the option of a military
campaign
launched on
6 January appeared to have lapsed, and the timelines
were
“uncertain”.
52.
The MOD did
not regard the position that we would know a material
breach
when we see
it as a suitable basis for planning.
53.
Mr Hoon’s
view was that agreement with the US on what constituted a
trigger
for
military action was needed quickly.
54.
On 19
November, following a visit to the US by Admiral Sir Michael
Boyce, Chief
of the
Defence Staff (CDS), and before the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation)
Summit in
Prague on 21 November and the planned debate on Iraq on 25
November,
Mr Peter
Watkins, Principal Private Secretary to Mr Geoff Hoon, the
Defence Secretary,
sent
Sir David Manning an update on military discussions with the
US.19
He set out
the
themes
which had emerged and registered a number of concerns, including
the need
to press
the US to clarify Turkey’s position.
55.
Mr Watkins
wrote that the option of a military campaign launched on 6 January
2003
seemed to
have “effectively lapsed” and the timelines were “uncertain”. The
US military
position
was described as “get ready, but not too ready”, because they did
“not want to
bring too
large a force to too high a pitch of readiness”. The MOD was
concerned that:
“Lack of
clarity in US thinking about possible triggers for military action
needs to be
resolved
quickly, particularly in relation to the No‑Fly
Zones.”
18
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 17 November 2002, [extract ‘Iraq/Saddam,
WMD’].
19
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning
after UNSCR 1441’.
14