The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
our current
knowledge but act as a disincentive to potential sources. We
should
therefore
ensure an authoritative discussion … with the Allies at an early
stage.”
455.
Following the
discussion, a small number of amendments were made to the
Note,
including
the addition of the judgement that it was “too early to conclude
that there were
no
[chemical and biological] programmes”.251
An Annex to
the paper stated:
“So far no
chemical or biological munitions or stocks of agent have been
found, nor
have any Al
Hussein missiles or parts. A number of high level detainees claim
that
these
munitions and systems do not exist. However, there are serious
doubts over
their
openness and co-operation”.
456.
A number of
other possible explanations as to why no munitions or systems
had
been found
were identified, some supported by intelligence,
including:
•
destruction
or concealment on the battlefield;
•
destruction
to ensure they were not discovered by UNMOVIC
inspections;
•
a
concealment operation “so comprehensive that it did not allow for
the rapid
reconstitution
of an effective CBW or Al Hussein missile capability”;
•
a political
decision-making process paralysed by the Coalition
attack;
•
exaggeration
of Iraq’s capabilities by Iraqi opposition groups, “possibly
through
deliberate
manipulation by the Iraqi intelligence services. UK
intelligence
assessments
did not rely heavily on reporting from Iraqi opposition groups, but
it
cannot be
ruled out that UK sources indirectly picked up some
disinformation.”
457.
The revised
Note was sent to Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Sir David Manning
(British
Ambassador
to the US) and JIC Members, by Mr Scarlett on
12 September.252
458.
The JIC
Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD discussed the ISG Interim Report
on
12 September.
It agreed advice for Mr Straw, Mr Hoon, Sir Nigel
Sheinwald and
Sir Richard
Dearlove to use in contacts with their US
counterparts.253
459.
Mr Edward
Oakden, FCO Director International Security, wrote:
“The
objective, self-evidently – which I underlined repeatedly at the
JIC Sub-Group –
is to play
down Kay’s Report, making clear its interim nature: very far from
the ISG’s
considered
assessment.”
251
Note [JIC],
[undated], ‘Iraqi WMD: The Emerging Picture – Discussion Note for
the JIC Meeting
10 September
2003’.
252
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 12 September 2003, ‘Iraqi Survey group:
interim report’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
[undated], ‘Kay Report: Points to Make with US Interlocutors’ and
Note [JIC], [undated],
‘Iraqi WMD:
The Emerging Picture - Discussion Note for the JIC Meeting
10 September 2003’.
253
Minute
Oakden to Private Secretary [FCO], 12 September 2003, ‘Iraq
WMD: Handling the Interim
ISG Report’.
516