The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of Forces
Agreement to meet our military and legal requirements from the
end
of this year.”
857.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported on 20 March that Basra had been
“quite
tense” that
week, with “spasmodic violence between the ISF and JAM,
including
the
assassination of senior police officers”.419
He
considered that JAM knew that
Gen Mohan’s
plan was gaining acceptance, and might be starting to act
while
they felt they
still had the initiative. MND(SE) was focusing its efforts on
developing
Gen Mohan’s
plans with him and “ensuring they are workable, not unduly
kinetic”.
858.
Brigadier
Julian Free, Commander of the 4th Mechanised Brigade and
Deputy
Commander
Operations, attended the first meeting of the joint MNF/Iraqi
Government
committee
in Baghdad that was considering how best to support Gen Mohan’s
security
plan for
Basra. Maj Gen White-Spunner described it as “a useful first
meeting that has
set the
parameters and identified who was responsible for informing the key
decisions
that would
determine how fast General Mohan’s plan can be
enacted”.
859.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported that he had briefed Gen Keane in similar
terms
as Lt Gen
Austin when he visited on 17 March, “emphasising that we believe
General
Mohan does
not want to open up a major kinetic front in Basra”.
860.
Mr Prentice
told the Inquiry that Prime Minister Maliki had been:
“… hearing
exaggerated reports in early 2008 about the deterioration in
local
security.
There were some assassinations of people of consequence to him … if
he
had a
long-term vision it was that his political pitch in any national
elections would
have to be
based on him having asserted the strong hand of
government.”420
861.
As a result,
Mr Prentice told the Inquiry that when Prime Minister Maliki
was briefed
on Gen
Mohan’s plan “he said ‘it’s too slow, too late’” as he “clearly
wanted to have
asserted
his authority across the South in time for the provincial
elections”.421
862.
Lieutenant
General John Cooper, who had succeeded Lt Gen Rollo as
SBMR-I
on 23
March, reported two days into his tour that:
“The week’s
most notable development … has been Prime Minister Maliki’s
trip
down to
Basra and his apparent replacement of Mohan as the commander of
Basra
Operations
Command. Exactly what prompted this remains subject to
speculation.
I am told
Maliki has for some time had concerns about … [the Basra ISF’s]
alleged
deal-making
and (arguably prudent) unwillingness to take action early
against
the militias
…
419
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 20 March 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
20 March 2008’.
420
Private
hearing, 15 June 2010, pages 33-34.
421
Private
hearing, 15 June 2010, page 34.
340