12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
reconstruction
and SSR … lasting for up to six months”,68
the
military element of
which became
known as Operation SALAMANCA and included operations
against
militia groups.
124.
Major General
Richard Shirreff, GOC MND(SE) from July 2006 until January
2007,
anticipated
that during Op SALAMANCA there would be “a concerted and
sustained
effort by
Police Training Teams”69
to “turn
those police stations capable of improvement
into police
stations that are capable of providing basic security in their
local areas”.
His aim
was “to cull the unredeemable and rehabilitate the ‘just about’
salvageable”.
125.
In September,
as set out in Section 9.8, the scope of Op SALAMANCA
was
constrained.
It later became known as Operation SINBAD.
126.
While most
reports from theatre indicated that Op SINBAD had progressed
well,
it does not
appear to have created the significant development in the Iraqi
Army’s
capability
that had been desired. On 27 October, Mr Blair was informed
that the Iraqi
Army had
performed well in some areas but it still lacked
maturity.
127.
Operations
designed to weed out corrupt officers were only able to achieve
limited
success
because a proper governance structure within the ministries and
judicial
system was
lacking. Operation THYME in December 2006 sought to purge the
Serious
Crime Unit
of corrupt officers, but the DOP(I) was told in January 2007 that,
although
arrest
warrants had been issued for members of the Serious Crime Unit,
they had not
been
actioned. There were signs that those members of the Serious Crime
Unit were
“continuing
to operate”.70
128.
Mr Blair
stated that, during his visit to Iraq at the end of 2006, “he had
sensed,
for the
first time, that Iraqi Generals felt that if they were given the
right training and
equipment
they would be able to do the job”.71
129.
On 24 January
2007, Mr Des Browne, the Defence Secretary from May
2006
to October
2008, wrote to Mr Blair to update him on the rationale behind
a planned
reduction
in troops from 7,000 to 4,500‑5,000:
“There is
no question of us leaving a vacuum in the city [Basra], as the IA
and
IPS are
already doing patrols and we will remain present in the Provincial
Joint
Co‑ordination
Centre and military transition teams. Early evidence from the
final
stages of
Op SINBAD, where the IA are in some areas not just in the lead
but
doing it
by themselves, is that inevitably they enjoy a greater level of
consent than
we do – but
also that they are doing a decent job. They are far from the
finished
68
Minute
Burke‑Davies to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 August 2006,
‘Iraq: Op SALAMANCA’.
69
Minute
Shirreff, 15 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
15 September 2006’.
70
Minutes, 11
January 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
71
Cabinet
Conclusions, 11 January 2007.
437