9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
Iranian
influence.496
More than
ever, he added, senior Iraqi officials were beginning
to
ask the
same questions.
1012.
Lt Gen Cooper
considered that the fact that Gen Petraeus saw the South as
the
front line
in the battle against Iranian influence in Iraq meant that he was
likely to focus
on Basra as
soon as he returned from Washington after his testimony. US forces
were
expected to
remain in MND(SE) for some time. Lt Gen Cooper
commented:
“… there
seems little doubt that MND(SE) has changed for good. I think there
is also
an
increasing consensus around the UK’s options to respond to this –
probably best
described
as ‘lead’, ‘follow’ or ‘get out of the way’ …
“It is
clear from my discussions here that the US view of the current HQ
MND(SE) is
that it is
not a proper two star HQ. That is why they reinforced … in order to
achieve
greater
situational awareness and an enhanced planning and fires
capability. They
will wish
to ensure that these capabilities remain in the future in order to
have
the desired
effect in Basra. The question will be whether the US or UK
supplies
those
capabilities and in what balance. This may demand a
re-enlargement
of
HQ MND(SE) in terms of UK staff and capability, but it should
not require
additional units …
“I think we
should be looking at the current position as an opportunity rather
than
a threat.
It is hard to escape the view that the current situation in Basra
is not that
which we
would wish. If we want to depart leaving a sound and robust legacy,
with
our
reputation intact, Basra will need an improved Iraqi Army, a
reformed IPS and a
sound
expectation for long term economic regeneration. We are now better
placed
to move
more quickly to our desired endstate than we have been for some
time,
but this
will require close and vigorous [effort] … Taking this opportunity
for the UK
to lead
this will be important for our collective self-esteem. As
Ambassador Crocker
said in his
testimony this week ‘We will be judged on how we depart not on
how
we arrived’.”
1013.
On 14 April,
Mr Prentice reported to the FCO his view that Iranian
influence had
been
central to Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to call a cease-fire at the
end of March.497
Prime
Minister Maliki’s Charge of the Knights had unsettled the Iranians
and caused
them to
reassess their 100 percent support for him. Mr Prentice
commented:
“These
events have once again shown the extent of Iranian influence in
Iraq:
having been
a major contributor to the problem, Iran then became central
to
delivering
the cease-fire. But many in the GoI … have been shocked and
angered
by Iran’s
behaviour and their continued brazen support for JAM Special
Groups
in particular …
496
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 14 April 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (296) 14 Apr
08’.
497
eGram
14136/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 14 April 2008, ‘Iraq: Iranian
Influence – Lessons
From Basra’.
371