4.4 | The
search for WMD
1.
This
Section addresses:
•
the
post-invasion search for evidence of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)
in Iraq;
•
the
Government’s response to the failure to find stockpiles of WMD in
Iraq;
•
demands for
an independent judge-led inquiry into pre-conflict intelligence
on
Iraq’s WMD
and the decision to establish the Butler Review; and
•
the
Government’s involvement with the preparation and publication of
the series
of reports
produced by the Iraq Survey Group.
2.
This
Section summarises, but does not include, detailed comment on
findings relating
to
pre-conflict intelligence on Iraqi WMD and the post-conflict search
for WMD published
between
2003 and 2005 by:
•
the House
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee;
•
the
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament;
•
the Hutton
Inquiry;
•
the Butler
Review;
•
the Iraq
Survey Group;
•
the US
Senate Committee on Intelligence; and
•
the US
Commission on Intelligence Capabilities.
3.
The
pre-invasion intelligence on Iraqi WMD and the withdrawal three
lines of
reporting
by the Secret Intelligence Service in 2003 and 2004 are addressed
in
Sections 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3.
•
The search for
evidence of WMD in Iraq was started during the military
campaign
by
Exploitation Task Force-75 and was carried forward from June 2003
by the Iraq
Survey
Group (ISG). The UK participated in both. By June 2004, the ISG had
a staff
of 1,787,
of whom 54 came from the UK.
•
As the
insurgency developed, the ISG’s operating conditions became
increasingly
difficult.
There was competition for resources between counter-terrorism
operations
and the
search for WMD evidence, and some ISG staff were diverted to the
former.
•
Mr Blair
took a close interest in the work of the ISG and the presentation
of its reports
and the
wider narrative about WMD. He raised the subject with President
Bush.
•
The Government
was confident that pre-conflict assessments of Iraq’s
WMD
capabilities
would be confirmed once Saddam Hussein’s regime had been
removed.
•
It quickly
became apparent that it was unlikely that significant stockpiles
would
be found.
This led to challenges to the credibility of both the Government
and the
intelligence
community.
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