The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
853.
When the UK
acceded to the US request that it assume leadership of a
military
Area of
Responsibility encompassing four provinces in southern Iraq, it did
so without a
robust
analysis either of the strategic implications for the UK or of the
military’s capacity
to support
the UK’s potential obligations in the region.
854.
A step of such
magnitude should be taken deliberately and having considered
the
wider
strategic and resource implications and contingent
liabilities.
855.
That requires
all government departments whose responsibilities will be
engaged
to have
been formally involved in providing Ministers with coherent
inter‑departmental
advice
before decisions are taken; the proper function of the Cabinet
Committee system.
856.
The UK had not
participated in an opposed invasion and full‑scale occupation
of
a sovereign
State (followed by shared responsibility for security and
reconstruction over
a long
period) since the end of the Second World War. The particular
circumstances of
Op TELIC
are unlikely to recur. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be drawn
about major
operations
abroad and the UK’s approach to armed intervention.
857.
The UK did not
achieve its objectives, despite the best efforts and acceptance
of
risk in a
dangerous environment by military and civilian
personnel.
858.
Although the
UK expected to be involved in Iraq for a lengthy period after
the
conflict,
the Government was unprepared for the role in which the UK found
itself from
April 2003.
Much of what went wrong stemmed from that lack of
preparation.
859.
In any
undertaking of this kind, certain fundamental elements are of
vital
importance:
•
the best
possible appreciation of the theatre of operations, including the
political,
cultural
and ethnic background, and the state of society, the economy
and
infrastructure;
•
a
hard‑headed assessment of risks;
•
objectives
which are realistic within that context, and if necessary limited –
rather
than
idealistic and based on optimistic assumptions; and
•
allocation
of the resources necessary for the task – both military and
civil.
860.
All of these
elements were lacking in the UK’s approach to its role
in
post‑conflict Iraq.
861.
Where
responsibility is to be shared, it is essential to have written
agreement
in advance
on how decision‑making and governance will operate within an
alliance or
coalition.
The UK normally acts with allies, as it did in Iraq. Within the
NATO Alliance,
the rules
and mechanisms for decision‑taking and the sharing of
responsibility have
been
developed over time and are well understood. The Coalition in Iraq,
by contrast,
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