4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
recommended
sites”, and continued to be receptive to UK advice on potential
targets.
Finds had
included:
•
“nuclear-related
documents hidden at the home of […] an Iraqi scientist”
on
16 January,
although “the general perception has been that these do
not
constitute
a ‘smoking gun’”;
•
“CW
associated rocket warheads at Ukhaider Ammunition depot” the
same
day. The
liquid in one warhead was “awaiting the delivery of chemical
sampling
equipment”.
That had arrived but was “not yet operational”;
•
a “small
quantity of … CW precursor chemicals at a Laboratory”;
•
“aluminium
nozzles for 80mm rockets that Iraq had recast, but not
declared”
were
discovered by the IAEA on 31 January; and
•
“parts”
from a “suspected … biological or chemical sub-munition” were
found
“at the
al-Numan factory” on 2 February.
307.
The Iraqis
realised that some inspections had “been mounted on the basis
of
intelligence”,
and had “increased even further the measures being taken to
prevent
damaging
material being uncovered by either UNMOVIC or IAEA”. That
included
“ensuring
that WMD material only remains at a particular location for an
absolute
maximum of
24 hours, and contingency plans to ensure that ‘crowds’ will always
be
available
to disrupt an inspection that might prove successful”.
308.
The DIS report
concluded:
“UNMOVIC
and the IAEA are capable of conducting thorough
inspections;
however,
mistakes have resulted in at least two inspections failing to
uncover
concealed material
…
“UNMOVIC
and IAEA remain very receptive to UK intelligence. On
balance,
however, in
the absence of Iraqi cooperation, we assess that the discovery of
a
‘smoking
gun’ will probably be the result of intelligence information, skill
on the part
of the
inspectors, an Iraqi mistake, and an element of luck.”
309.
The ISC
reported that:
•
SIS
provided UN inspectors with about 170 intelligence reports
between
December
2000 and March 2003;
•
the DIS
also provided regular briefings;
•
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw confirmed that the UK passed all UK-owned
intelligence
that was
relevant to UN inspections; and
•
the UK had
provided intelligence packs on 19 sites.122
122
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 136.
349