The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

649. Maj Gen Shirreff reported that he had agreed with Dr Marsden and the Head of

the DFID Office in Basra that to address that gap, the PRT needed to be directed to

work more closely with MND(SE), and that it needed clearer direction from London to

ensure it focused on delivering short-term projects rather than on long-term projects to

build Iraqi capacity. Those steps might “obviate the need for a JIATF [Joint Inter-Agency

Task Force] under command MND(SE)”.

650. The report was sent to No.10 on 1 December and passed to Mr Blair the

same day.371

651. Lt Gen Shirreff told the Inquiry that the US had agreed to provide “significant

amounts” of US funding for the reconstruction component of the operation, of which

he spent US$80m.372

652. Lt Gen Shirreff also told the Inquiry that while MND(SE) worked with the PRT as

much as it could, the PRT was in “some state of disarray” at that time.373 He had “pretty

close links” with Dr Marsden and the British Embassy Office Basra, including through a

forward headquarters in Basra Palace, but effective co-ordination was difficult as long as

MND(SE) and the British Embassy Office Basra were not co-located.

653. Lt Gen Shirreff concluded that the “inter-governmental piece” had failed by the time

of Op SINBAD.

654. In response to the concerns that Maj Gen Shirreff had raised with Mr Brown on

18 November, the Treasury convened a meeting with DFID, FCO and MOD officials

on 7 December to consider whether the UK should prioritise short-term economic

interventions in Basra.374

655. A Treasury official advised Mr Brown on 13 December that the meeting had

concluded that:

• Money was not a “binding constraint” in the South. The “potential pool”

comprised US$176m from the Iraqi Government, US$260m from the US and

US$550m in soft loans from the Japanese. Money was available for short‑term

interventions: only £1.1m of the £5m Rapid Reaction Fund (part of DFID’s

SIESP) had so far been spent.

• The inability to generate good project ideas was a constraint.

• Bringing the southern Iraq Steering Group under a single command would be

possible and could be effective but might prove contentious.

371 Letter McNeil to Banner, 1 December 2006, ‘Iraq: Update’ attaching Report Shirreff, 30 November 2006,

‘GOC(MND)SE – southern Iraq Update – 30 November 2006’; Minute Banner to Prime Minister,

1 December 2006, ‘Iraq Update: 1 December’.

372 Public hearing, 11 January 2010, page 16.

373 Public hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 20-21.

374 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 13 December 2006, ‘Basra Visit: Responding to Major

General Shirreff’s Concerns’.

302