The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
192.
Mr Sawers set
out the main issues and posed a number of questions,
including:
•
“Do we
really want UN inspectors to go back into Iraq while Saddam remains
in
power?”
They might constrain Iraq’s WMD programme but their presence
would
allow
Saddam Hussein to provoke regular crises.
•
“Could we
stop enforcing the southern NFZ?” Military views differed, and it
was
not just a
military judgement.
•
“How can we
play up the prospects for Iraq once they get rid of
Saddam?”
Mr Sawers
advised that: “A Contract with Iraq (like the one we offered to
Serbia)
is
possible. But I think we have to resist those Americans who want to
fund a
1980s
Afghanistan-style insurgency, as that will only trigger a
humanitarian
catastrophe
through Iraqi repression.”
193.
Mr Sawers
advised that, in his view, the Security Council should maintain a
strong
grip on
Iraqi oil revenues while moving to substantially lighter sanctions,
ease up on
the
pressure to get inspections back into Iraq, while making it “more
explicit” that there
would be a
military response if Iraq attacked a neighbour or reconstituted its
WMD.
194.
On 16
February, US and UK aircraft attacked elements of the Iraqi
air-defence
system. Six
targets were engaged; five were north of the boundary of the
southern NFZ.
195.
The attacks
were controversial. Mr Tony Benn, in his capacity as President
of
Labour
Action for Peace, wrote to Mr Blair seeking the recall of
Parliament.105
196.
There was a
strong reaction in the Arab world.
On 16
February 2001, US and UK aircraft attacked elements of the Iraqi
air-defence
system. Six
targets were engaged; five were north of the boundary of the
southern NFZ.
Mr Blair
issued a statement on the attacks the following
day.106
He stated
that Saddam
Hussein was
pursuing a policy of “total control” over the people of Iraq, and
was “ready
to engage
in systematic repression”, in particular of the Kurds in the north
of Iraq and
the Shia in
the south. The NFZs were part of a wider effort to contain the
threat posed by
Saddam
Hussein. Without them, he would be able to move his troops freely
and “repress
his own
people mercilessly, including by using helicopter gunships as he
did in 1991 and
1992”. The
attack by coalition aircraft had been “a limited operation” with
the sole purpose
of
defending the aircrew patrolling the NFZs.
105
Letter Benn
to Blair, 16 February 2001, [untitled].
106
Gov.uk, 17
February 2001, Statement
by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, London, Saturday 17
February
2001.
228