The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
helicopters
on operations given “the scale and intensity of our current
operational
commitments”.
1266.
One of the
principles underpinning the MOD’s approach to helicopters
was
“to rationalise
our helicopters by theatre”. Mr Browne added:
“While we
are clear about the imperative to provide increased support to
operations
in the
short term, we are also concerned not to sacrifice the future
sustainability of
the
helicopter fleet for the immediate needs of today.”
1267.
Mr Browne
wrote that helicopter support to operations in Iraq was
“generally
assessed as
satisfactory” and therefore additional capability for Afghanistan
was
the priority.
1268.
The update
noted that there were five Merlin and six Lynx in Basra and
there
were seven
helicopters in Baghdad. The Sea King fleet had been withdrawn
earlier
than
planned because of the reduction in troop levels and the
helicopters were being
switched to
Afghanistan, four having already been deployed.
1269.
The
requirement for the six Danish Merlins procured to enable the
release of the
Sea King
fleet from Iraq had “fallen away along with our reduction in force
levels there”
so the
possibility of deploying them to Afghanistan was under
consideration.
1270.
Mr Browne
explained:
“It may
seem counter‑intuitive that, despite the fact we have so many
more
helicopters
in our inventory, we are able to deploy a relatively small number
on
operations.
We are limited by the need to keep our burden on our airframes,
crews
and ground
support staff at a sustainable level over time. As a rule of thumb,
it takes
three or
four additional helicopters to enable the deployment of a single
helicopter
on
operations with the remaining aircraft used for training and to
enable us to rotate
our
deployed helicopters in and out of maintenance and to carry out
essential
modification
programmes.”
1271.
Mr Browne
concluded:
“To borrow
a line from David Cameron, there is no ‘magic pot’ of money into
which
we can dip
in order to buy all the helicopters we might like to. We do not
have
access to
the Treasury Reserve for the procurement of such enduring
capabilities,
and
helicopters must compete with other pressing requirements within
our
hard‑pressed
equipment programme. Equally neither are there any
helicopters
currently
readily available on the market which would be an obvious
aspiration for
us; most
order books are full, and the procurement of a new helicopter type
would
be both
costly and time‑consuming.
“That said,
I can give you an assurance that, while we continue to make the
most
of what we
have got … This is not an area where we can afford
complacency.
214