3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
565.
Mr Blair’s
decision not to reveal that he had received Lord Goldsmith’s
draft
advice, or
that it concluded a further determination by the Security Council
that
Iraq was in
material breach of its obligations would be required to provide
the
legal basis
for military action, is addressed in Section 5.
566.
Despite the
imminence of the formal decision to offer a significant
land
contribution
Cabinet was informed only that forces were building up in the
Gulf.
There is no
evidence of any discussion of the nature and scale of the likely
UK
contribution
of ground forces or their imminent deployment.
567.
The formal
proposal for the deployment was sent to Mr Blair later
that
day. The
absence of any formal collective discussion of the proposal by
senior
Ministers
before it was approved by Mr Blair is addressed in Sections
6.2 and 6.5.
568.
Nor did
Cabinet discuss the strategic implications of making such a
military
contribution,
including the risks associated with military action and the
potential
responsibilities
which might be incurred.
569.
The need
for such a discussion is addressed in Section 7.
570.
Although
Mr Blair had said on 24 October 2002 that Cabinet would, “in
due time”
be able to
discuss the military options, and he had said on 9 January that the
discussion
on 16
January would be an “in‑depth discussion” of Iraq, Cabinet was not
told that the
imminent
deployment of a large scale ground force to southern Iraq was under
serious
consideration.
571.
The
development of thinking in the MOD on the options for deploying a
large
scale
ground force for operations in southern Iraq, including the
presentation to Mr Blair
on
15 January and his response, and the way in which the decision
was then taken to
deploy UK
forces, is described in detail Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
572.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair on 16 January seeking agreement to the “key
role
in southern
Iraq” proposed by the US for the UK:
“Important
questions remain to be resolved … But the role proposed for the
UK
is a
sensible and significant one, and I recommend that with certain
qualifications,
we accept
it. We need to decide quickly.
“If you
agree, I propose to announce the composition and deployment of the
force
in an
oral statement on Monday 20 January.”188
573.
Copies of the
letter were sent to Mr Brown, Mr Straw and
Sir Andrew Turnbull.
188
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
101