The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
980.
Dr Rubaie
expressed his personal regard for the UK and the UK role in Iraq
over
the
previous five years. But Prime Minister Maliki had received
information about the
relationship
between the UK and JAM which had undermined his confidence in
UK
forces in
Basra, leading him to tell Gen Petraeus that he did not want UK
forces involved
in the
operation.
981.
The Chiefs of
Staff were told on 8 April that it had “now become clear that the
US
had always
considered Basra to be ‘ungoverned space’ which MNC-I had planned
to
address
towards the end of 2008”.484
982.
The Charge of
the Knights had simply accelerated US intervention in Basra,
which
had now
been designated by MNC-I as the second priority after Baghdad,
“resulting
(significantly)
in the provision of continuous ISTAR coverage over the city
which,
combined
with the deployment of US and UK Military Transition Teams (MiTTs),
had
dramatically
improved situational awareness”.
983.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that the current situation in Basra:
“… placed
the UK in an uncomfortable position though it was important not to
miss
the current
potential window of opportunity, alongside the US, to deliver
tangible
progress on
development. The UK’s longer term strategic objectives in Iraq
would
need
consideration alongside both national and military reputation. The
Iraqi and US
position
with regard to JAM needed clarity in the light of the recent ISF
operations in
Basra; it
was possible that the US might be forced to adopt a more robust
position
against JAM
if it continued to support Prime Minister Maliki. This would
have
consequences
for the current operational design in MND(SE).”
984.
A message from
the British Embassy Office Basra on 9 April said that, at
Prime
Minister
Maliki’s request, a tribal committee had been established whose
“broad plan is
to
establish dialogue with OMS; support ISF and police in the search
for weapons, and
support the
process of handing in weapons”.485
The
committee had divided the city into
areas,
within which a sub-committee would work to persuade militia members
to hand
over their
weapons.
985.
On 8 and 9
April, Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified in Congress
on
security
and political progress in Iraq for a second time.486
986.
Ambassador
Crocker said:
“Immense
challenges remain and progress is uneven and often frustratingly
slow;
but there
is progress. Sustaining that progress will require continuing US
resolve
and
commitment. What has been achieved is substantial, but it is also
reversible.”
484
Minutes, 8
April 2008, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
485
eGram
13473/08 Basra to FCO London, 9 April 2008, ‘Basra Update – 9 April
2008’.
486
Testimony
to Congress, 8 April 2008, ‘Testimony of Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker
before the Senate
Foreign
Relations Committee’.
364