The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The Report
also states that significant parts of the intelligence have now
been
found by
the Secret Intelligence Service to be in doubt. The Chief of the
SIS,
Sir Richard
Dearlove, has told me that it accepts all the conclusions
and
recommendations
of Lord Butler’s Report that concern the Service. The SIS
will
fully
address the recommendations that Lord Butler has made about its
procedures
and about
the need for the Service properly to resource them. The
Service
has played
and continues to play, a vital role in countering worldwide the
tide
of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, its successes
are evident in
Lord
Butler’s Report.
“I accept
the Report’s conclusions in full. Any mistakes should not be laid
at the
door of our
intelligence and security community. They do a tremendous job
for
our
country. I accept full personal responsibility for the way in which
the issue was
presented
and therefore for any errors that were made.”465
828.
The Inquiry
cites the findings of the Butler Review at a number of points
in
Sections 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3 where they best illuminate the issues under
discussion,
rather than
attempting to summarise them in one place. Those
include:
•
Findings
relating to the intelligence underpinning individual JIC
Assessments
and the
quality of those Assessments;
•
Findings on
the way in which intelligence and JIC Assessments were used
to
underpin
public statements by the Government, and in particular the
September
2002
dossier and statements to Parliament;
•
Findings on
the reporting issued in September 2002 about the production
of
chemical
agent; and
•
Findings on
the serious doubts about other lines of reporting and the
eventual
withdrawal
of that reporting, including reports about mobile facilities for
the
production
of biological agent and the claim that chemical and
biological
munitions
could be moved into place for an attack within 45
minutes.
829.
Mr Blair
discussed the ISG Comprehensive Report with President Bush
in
late
July.
830.
Mr Blair
stated to officials that the Comprehensive Report needed to
indicate
the degree
of certainty that Iraq had not possessed WMD and how far the
security
situation
in Iraq had affected the search.
831.
Officials
warned of the need to avoid any repeat of allegations that the
UK
had exerted
improper pressure on the preparation of the previous ISG
report.
465
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
14 July 2004, column 1435.
588