9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
between the
two principal UIA contenders, Adel Abdul Mehdi (SCIRI) and
Ibrahim
Ja’afari
(Dawa). We see little sign of any willingness from any of the
principal parties
in the UIA
… to switch their support from their first choice candidate … and
no
chance that
they would allow even a Shia outsider … to take the
job.”238
505.
Mr Patey
advised that the UK should not express a preference for a
particular
candidate
but should continue to encourage all the parties to agree a
broad-based
representative
coalition.
506.
Mr Patey
reported that he had been:
“… pressed
by some for an indication of the UK’s preferences, particularly
on
candidates
for Prime Minister. I have emphasised to all my interlocutors
that,
while the
UK has a clear interest in the outcome, our priority is for an
acceptable
overall
package ensuring a broadly effective and balanced government,
containing
competent
Ministers who should be non-sectarian, particularly where the
key
security
positions are concerned.”
507.
Lt Gen
Houghton reported to Gen Walker on 1 January that Gen Casey
was
considering
how best to prioritise and implement the various elements of the
military
campaign
(defeating terrorism, neutralising the Sunni insurgency and
supporting
transition
to effective ISF) in 2006 and how to respond to US political
aspirations for
significant
troop level reductions.239
508.
In Lt Gen
Houghton’s view, “the principal focus for 2006 should be the
support to
Transition”
with a campaign that focused on:
•
building
ISF capacity, with particular focus on the police and the
security
ministries;
•
reducing
MNF presence and visibility and putting ISF increasingly in the
lead;
•
resourcing
the stabilisation (principally by ISF) of the nine strategic
cities;
•
increased
use of the “soft elements of power rather than a kinetic
approach”;
•
addressing
the problem of militias; and
•
accelerating
progress in establishing the Rule of Law.
509.
Lt Gen
Houghton indicated that he thought that this type of focus on
transition was
likely to
be Gen Casey’s preferred approach, but “it may not play well to US
aspirations
for the
defeat of terrorism”. He also commented that he thought that Gen
Casey was
238
eGram
21805/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 31 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Formation
of New Government’.
239
Minute
Houghton to CDS, 1 January 2006, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (193) 01
January 06’.
573