The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
363.
Mr Blair’s
view, as reported on 3 September by Sir David Manning, was
for
“nothing to
be said to the US about Op FRESCO for the moment”.116
Mr Blair
hoped it
would be
possible to discuss the issues with Mr Hoon the following week
before he flew
to
Washington.
364.
Mr Blair
discussed the UK’s military contribution with Mr Hoon on 5
September.117
Mr Straw
was also present.
365.
Mr Peter
Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, recorded that
Mr Blair,
Mr Hoon
and Mr Straw had discussed the packages, and that Mr Hoon
had highlighted
the
benefits of Package 2. “No decisions were taken” and Mr Blair
“did not expect
President
Bush to commit himself imminently to a military
campaign”.
366.
Mr Watkins
also recorded that Mr Hoon had met Mr Gordon Brown,
Chancellor of
the
Exchequer, to discuss the options and alert him to the likely costs
of Package 2.
367.
There was no
No.10 record of the meeting.
368.
Mr Watkins
wrote to No.10 on 6 September, providing an update on US
military
planning
and “the factors informing decisions on any UK military
contribution”.118
He
cautioned
that the MOD’s assessment was “necessarily provisional”, partly
because
the US plan
was still evolving, and partly because there had not yet been
“detailed joint
planning
with the US”.
369.
The MOD had
identified three options ranging from minimum to maximum
effort,
including a
further revision of the impact of Op FRESCO which meant
that:
“Were we to
throw in everything we are likely to have, the UK could
potentially
generate up
to a divisional headquarters, an armoured brigade, 16 Air
Assault
Brigade and
a logistic brigade.”
370.
The MOD was
also “examining whether a Royal Marine Commando could
form
part of
Package 2 [the air and maritime forces packages]”.
371.
A land Task
Force would “offer significant capability to a US‑led
northern
force,
although it would not be fully suitable for involvement in decisive
war‑fighting
operations”.
372.
The MOD advice
concluded that should “US military preparations continue at
their
current
pace, we will face some early tough decisions within two weeks of
your return
from Camp
David”.
116
Letter
Manning to Williams, 3 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Potential UK
Contribution and a Fire Strike’.
117
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
118
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
158