13.1 | Resources

“Clare [Short] asked for more resources in Cabinet (‘I can’t take resources away

from Ethiopia’) and the PM looked at me with one of his smiles – what does she

want/need – and what might we offer?”

278. Mr Hoon’s Private Office sent Sir David Manning an update on military planning

on 28 February.168

279. The section on “Day After” planning identified five UK concerns, including funding

for reconstruction. US planning assumed the rest of the world would pick up 75 percent

of the bill for reconstruction. That was “possibly hopelessly optimistic”. As an Occupying

Power, the UK would be at the front of the queue of countries the US would approach to

make up any deficit.

280. Copies of the paper were sent to the FCO, Treasury and Cabinet Office, but not

to DFID.

281. A Treasury official advised Mr Boateng on 5 March that, with little clarity on the

scale of the humanitarian response that would be required and on the UK’s contribution

to it and no actual bid for resources from DFID, it was difficult to respond substantively

to the concerns expressed by Ms Short in her 5 February and 14 February letters to

Mr Blair.169

282. The official recommended that Mr Boateng write to Ms Short, setting out the

Treasury’s two main concerns:

• that funding for reconstruction should be an international effort; and

• that Ministers should be aware that the Reserve was “not in a position to fund

large amounts of new expenditure”.

283. The Treasury has informed the Inquiry that it has no record of Mr Boateng writing

to Ms Short as a result of that advice.170

284. Ms Short held a meeting with DFID officials on 5 March to discuss Iraq and

in particular the legality of “reconstruction work” without a covering UN mandate.171

Ms Short concluded that without a clear mandate for reconstruction, DFID could only

legally fund or undertake humanitarian work. DFID would not undertake reconstruction

work, or fund others to do so. DFID “should move away” from any expectation that it

would undertake an exemplary role, or that it would focus on any one area.

168 Letter Williams to Manning, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning and Preparation’ attaching Paper,

28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning Update – 28 February 2003’.

169 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Boateng, 5 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Letter from Clare Short on

Humanitarian Planning’.

170 Email Treasury [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 17 April 2014, ‘Further Queries relating

to Resources’.

171 Minute Bewes to Fernie, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq Update: 5 March’.

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