Executive Summary

622. In his statement to the Inquiry, Mr Blair said:

“... with hindsight, we now see that the military campaign to defeat Saddam was

relatively easy; it was the aftermath that was hard. At the time, of course, we could

not know that and a prime focus throughout was the military campaign itself …”217

623. The conclusions reached by Mr Blair after the invasion did not require the benefit

of hindsight.

624. Mr Blair’s long‑standing conviction that successful international intervention

required long‑term commitment had been clearly expressed in his Chicago speech

in 1999.

625. That conviction was echoed, in the context of Iraq, in frequent advice to Mr Blair

from Ministers and officials.

626. Between early 2002 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Mr Blair received

warnings about:

• the significance of the post‑conflict phase as the “strategically decisive”

phase of the engagement in Iraq (in the SPG paper of 13 December 2002218)

and the risk that a badly handled aftermath would make intervention a “net

failure” (in the letter from Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Sir David Manning of

19 November 2002219);

• the likelihood of internal conflict in Iraq (including from Mr Powell on

26 September 2002, who warned of the need to stop “a terrible bloodletting

of revenge after Saddam goes. Traditional in Iraq after conflict”220);

• the potential scale of the political, social, economic and security challenge

(including from Sir Christopher Meyer (British Ambassador to the US) on

6 September 2002: “it will probably make pacifying Afghanistan look like

child’s play”221);

• the need for an analysis of whether the benefits of military action outweighed the

risk of a protracted and costly nation‑building exercise (including from Mr Straw

on 8 July 2002: the US “must also understand that we are serious about our

conditions for UK involvement”222);

• the absence of credible US plans for the immediate post‑conflict period and

the subsequent reconstruction of Iraq (including from the British Embassy

217 Statement Blair, 14 January 2011, page 14.

218 Paper [SPG], 13 December 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’.

219 Letter Watkins to Manning, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning after UNSCR 1441’.

220 Manuscript comment Powell to Manning on Letter McDonald to Manning, 26 September 2002,

‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after Saddam’.

221 Telegram 1140 Washington to FCO London, 6 September 2002, ‘PM’s visit to Camp David: Iraq’.

222 Letter Straw to Prime Minister, 8 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency Planning’.

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