The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

US forces south of Basra.91 The commander of Iraq’s 51st Mechanised Infantry Division

had surrendered and the southern oilfields and the oil infrastructure on the al-Faw

Peninsula had been secured.

141.  The 51st Mechanised Infantry Division had been located in the vicinity of the

az‑Zubayr oil pumping station several miles south-west of Basra.92

142.  Mr Scarlett informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 22 March that there was

evidence of Iraqi Army divisions being prepared to surrender at Basra and Nasiriyah.93

143.  Adm Boyce also reported to the meeting that the oilfields and platforms in the

South had been prepared for demolition by the Iraqis.

144.  The minutes of the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 22 March recorded that 1 MEF was

in full control of the Rumaylah oilfields and that UK engineers were making safe the

demolition charges and booby traps which had been found in many of the facilities.94

Seven oil wells were reported to be on fire, and two leaking. There were also reports

that regular units of the Iraq Army had moved out of Basra.

145.  The Chiefs of Staff were also informed that Coalition Forces had seized crossings

of the Euphrates, the Tallil airfield and the az-Zubayr oil pumping station.

146.  Mr Blair and President Bush spoke again on 22 March.95 Their review of military

developments included:

• an assessment that the campaign was ahead of objectives;

• surrenders were taking place on a massive scale in the South;

• many more Iraqis were deserting from the Iraqi Security Forces and melting

back into the civilian population;

• US forces were looking hard for traces of WMD and had already destroyed

some “WMD-type” manufacturing facilities; and

• the need to ensure that Syria realised that it should not hide Iraqi WMD or

harbour regime fugitives.

147.  Mr Blair said that it would be important to locate WMD manufacturing facilities.

He and President Bush agreed to speak on 24 March to discuss how to deal with

operations in Baghdad itself.

148.  AM Burridge wrote in his 8 May end of tour report that the decision to launch

the ground offensive before the start of the strategic air campaign, and in the process

91  Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 22 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Overnight Sitrep’.

92  Letter Watkins to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military Plan’.

93  Minutes, 22 March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.

94  Minutes, 22 March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

95  Minute Cannon to McDonald, 22 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s conversation with Bush, 22 March:

Military Developments’.

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