The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Internal
forces could only remove Saddam Hussein with the involvement of
a
Sunni
strongman; but such an individual would be acting to preserve
Sunni
hegemony.
That was “unlikely to be acceptable to Kurdish and in
particular,
Shia insurgents”.
•
The UK
intelligence community had consistently assessed that “the only
viable,
long term
successor to Saddam will come from within the Sunni
security/military
structure”.
He would be “unlikely to command popular support” and would
be
“forced
(and probably inclined) to run Iraq along autocratic lines”.
Iraq would
“remain a
unitary state”, but its long‑term problems “would not
disappear
with Saddam”.
•
A
“sustained air campaign combined with a ground invasion” would
topple
the regime.
70.
Addressing
Iraq’s defences, the DIS wrote:
•
The
disposition of Iraqi forces was “defensive”.
•
Saddam
Hussein would not take offensive action against the Kurds – he
knew
that would
“definitely provoke US action”.
•
Equipment
was “increasingly obsolescent” and US air supremacy was
“certain”.
Key units
might fight, “but the regime could fall quickly”.
•
“If
softened by an air campaign, and facing US ground forces”, the
collapse of
Iraqi
Regular Army (RA) units “could be as swift as it was in 1991,
particularly
given the
lack of a viable air force. The regime would quickly lose control
of
the South
…”
•
If the RA
and the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) “decided
that
they [were]
defending the Iraqi homeland and Sunni dominance rather
than
just Saddam
Hussein” they were “more likely to offer a tenacious
and
protracted resistance”.
71.
Addressing the
possibility of Iraq using WMD, the DIS wrote that it had “no
definitive
intelligence”
on Iraq’s concepts for the use of WMD:
“Iraq did
not employ WMD against coalition forces … [in 1991], nor
against
the
subsequent internal uprisings. We judge that Saddam wished to
avoid
regime‑threatening
retaliation from the coalition. Hence the use of WMD will be
linked
to
perception of regime survivability. Were the regime in danger of
imminent collapse,
Saddam
might consider use of WMD against internal opposition, US forces or
Israel.”
72.
Other points
made by the DIS included:
•
The US
would need three to four months to assemble a force capable of
taking
military
action. It was “conceivable” that it could be ready to begin the
first
phase of an
air campaign in May (when the UN was next due to review
Iraq)
“but late
summer would be better, not least to avoid ground operations in
the
summer heat”.
186