Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
programme.422 It asked the Government to set out how the acquisition of Mastiff vehicles
for Iraq and Afghanistan had impacted on the FRES requirement.
806.  In response, the MOD stated that there was “no impact on the FRES programme
resulting from the procurement of Mastiff”.423 The department had “a coherent two track
approach” to AFVs which made “a clear distinction between the urgent, short term need
for Protected Patrol Vehicles, such as Mastiff, designed for peace support operations”
and AFVs needed to “provide an effective FRES capability across the full spectrum of
future operations”. The MOD stated that Vector and Mastiff were designed to address
the risks faced by service personnel in the short term; FRES was always seen as a
longer‑term requirement.
807.  Sir Peter Spencer told the Inquiry that there had been a difficulty in specifying a
requirement for PPVs as the threat developed; and that “one of the major problems the
Army had had for over a decade was deciding what it wanted its new fleet of armoured
fighting vehicles to be”.424
808.  When asked about the procurement strategy for PPVs, Sir Peter referred to the
FRES programme: “ … a hugely ambitious programme which was never going to be
delivered in this decade … There were very difficult requirements stated for mobility and
protection and weight.”425
809.  The Inquiry asked Sir Peter whether the issues with FRES had made it harder
to deal with PPVs. He replied:
“… the difficulty became in the amounts of money which were available and if you
were going to use money from the capital equipment programme to deal with the
short term … then that had a fratricidal effect on your ability to move the FRES
programme forward.”426
810.  Lt Gen Fulton told the Inquiry that FRES and the replacement for Snatch were
“two completely different questions”.427 He said that “to put something in” to the Defence
programme, “something ha[d] to come out”; the resources had to be balanced out.
Lt Gen Fulton did not think that created a reluctance to give a Snatch replacement
a high priority.
422  Tenth Report of the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2007‑08, Defence Equipment
2008, HC 295.
423  Seventh Special Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2007‑08, Defence
Equipment 2008: Government response to the Committee’s Tenth Report of Session 2007‑08, HC 555.
424  Public hearing, 26 July 2010, pages 28‑29.
425  Public hearing, 26 July 2010, page 41.
426  Public hearing, 26 July 2010, pages 49‑50.
427  Public hearing, 27 July 2010, pages 70‑72.
138
Previous page | Contents | Next page