The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
836.
Mr Straw
told the House of Commons that the proposals submitted by
France,
Germany and
Russia for “more time and more inspections” sought to “rewrite”
resolution
1441. They
“would have allowed Saddam to continue stringing out
inspections
indefinitely,
and he would rightly have drawn the lesson that the Security
Council was
simply not
prepared to enforce the ultimatum … at the heart of resolution
1441”.
837.
Mr Straw
pointed out that “in the event of non-compliance” Iraq should, as
OP13
of resolution
1441 spelled out, expect “serious consequences”. Mr Straw
stated:
“As a
result of Saddam Hussein’s persistent refusal to meet the UN’s
demands,
and the
inability of the Security Council to adopt a further resolution,
the Cabinet
has decided
to ask the House to support the United Kingdom’s participation
in
military
operations, should they be necessary, with the objective of
ensuring the
disarmament
of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and thereby the
maintenance
of the
authority of the United Nations.”
838.
Mr Straw
confirmed that Parliament “would have an opportunity to debate
our
involvement
in military action prior to hostilities” the following day; and
that the debate
would be on
a substantive motion “proposed by the Prime Minister and
Cabinet
colleagues”.
He also drew the attention of the House to Lord Goldsmith’s
Written
Answer,
which “set out the legal basis for the use of force against Iraq”
and the
documents
provided earlier that day.
“Some say
that Iraq can be disarmed without an ultimatum, without the threat
or the
use of
force, but simply by more time and more inspections. That approach
is defied
by all our
experience over 12 weary years. It cannot produce the disarmament
of
Iraq; it
cannot rid the world of the danger of the Iraq regime. It can only
bring comfort
to tyrants
and emasculate the authority of the United Nations …”
840.
Mr Ancram
responded that diplomacy was “at an end” and there was the
“grim
prospect of
war … because Saddam Hussein has contemptuously failed to take the
final
opportunity
… offered him”. There had been “a chance that a clear, unequivocal
and
united
voice from the international community might … have persuaded him
to disarm
or to go.
France put paid to that. I hope that in Paris they will reflect
tonight on what they
841.
Mr Ancram
stated: “Saddam Hussein, in possession of weapons of
mass
destruction,
is a threat to international peace and security… including
ourselves.
That is why
we believe that action to disarm him can no longer be
delayed.”
293
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, columns 705-706.
546