9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
64.
Despite that
evidence, military planning under the leadership of
General
Sir Michael Walker,
Chief of the Defence Staff, proceeded on the basis that
the
situation in
Basra would remain relatively benign.
65.
The Inquiry
considers that a deterioration in security could and should have
been
identified
by Lt Gen Reith by the end of August 2003 and that the cumulative
evidence
of a
deteriorating security situation should have led him to conclude
that the underlying
assumptions
on which the UK’s Iraq campaign was based were over-optimistic, and
to
instigate a
review of the scale of the UK’s military effort in
Iraq.
66.
There were a
number of issues that might have been examined by such a
review,
including:
•
whether the
UK had sufficient resources in MND(SE) to deal with a
worsening
security
situation; and
•
whether the
UK should engage outside MND(SE) in the interests of
Iraq’s
overall
stability (as had been advocated by Gen Jackson, Maj Gen
Richards
and Lt Gen Pigott).
67.
No such review
took place.
68.
There was a
strong case for reinforcing MND(SE) so that it could handle its
high-
priority
tasks (providing essential security for reconstruction projects,
protecting existing
infrastructure,
guarding key sites and improving border security to inhibit the
import of
arms from
Iran) effectively in changing circumstances. Those tasks all
demanded a
higher
level of manpower than was available. Although additional military
personnel were
deployed in
September 2003, mainly to fill existing gaps in support for
reconstruction
activities,
their numbers were far too small to have a significant
impact.
69.
The failure to
consider the option of reinforcement at this time was a
serious
omission
and Lt Gen Reith and Gen Walker should have ensured that UK force
levels in
MND(SE)
were formally reconsidered in autumn 2003 or at the latest by the
end of the
year.
Increases in UK force levels in order to address the security
situation should have
been
recommended to Ministers. Any opportunity to regain the initiative
and pre-empt
further
deterioration in the security situation was lost.
70.
In October,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that Lieutenant General
Ricardo
Sanchez,
Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-7, had “come to recognise
that
Coalition
operations are at a standstill and that there is a need to regain
momentum”.15
Doubts
started to build about the chances of credible elections based on a
legitimate
constitution
in the course of 2004 and work began to look for alternatives to
the plan set
out by
Ambassador Bremer. The “bloodiest 48-hour period in Baghdad since
March”,16
15
Telegram
230 IraqRep to FCO London, 24 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Security
Update’.
16
Telegram
1426 Washington to FCO London, 28 October 2003, ‘Iraq: US Views 28
October’.
481