The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
665.
Mr Blair
wrote on Sir Nigel’s advice:
“This isn’t
really working at present. I will have to reflect on how we
progress …
I need a
meeting next week.”373
666.
On 1
September, Sir Hilary sent two telegrams from Basra, in response to
a
request
from No.10 for an immediate report, in advance of the meeting
requested by
Mr Blair,
on what he needed.
667.
In the first
telegram, Sir Hilary assessed that:
“The main
immediate need is a vastly increased effort, well beyond the
present
capabilities
of CPA(South) or MND(SE), to provide visible improvements in
the
provision
of power, water and fuel in a short timescale.” 374
668.
Under his
direction, CPA(South) and MND(SE) had developed an
Emergency
Plan for
Essential Services in Southern Iraq (the Essential Services Plan),
costed at
US$127m.
This would be discussed with DFID officials visiting Iraq and
Mr Bearpark,
and then
submitted to the AHMGIR for approval. However:
“More
generally, the scale and nature of the problem is well beyond
CPA(South)’s
present
capabilities, if we are to truly act as an ‘Authority’ and provide
direction
to others.
I have bid for more staff and ancillary back-up and will be bidding
for
more
…”
669.
Sir Hilary
reported that CPA(Baghdad) had “responded magnificently” to
his
request to
bring forward the move to safer and larger premises from
mid-November to
mid-October
but, until then, CPA(South) was unsafe and overcrowded, despite
DFID
holding
back staff from returning after their breaks and the withdrawal of
the Japanese.
670.
Sir Hilary
also reported that he had insufficient military protection vehicles
to
carry out
essential tasks, and that MND(SE) was proving “most unwilling to
the point of
refusal, to
dedicate more of their forces for this purpose”.
671.
Sir Hilary’s
comments on the provision of secure accommodation and transport
for
CPA(South)
personnel are considered in Section 15.1.
672.
Sir Hilary’s
second telegram contained a draft covering submission for
the
Essential
Services Plan.375
Sir Hilary
advised that the Plan was based on work
undertaken
by MND(SE) but had been “meshed with” a wider CPA(South) strategy
for
the medium
and long term. It was “formally” for CPA(Baghdad) to own and
resource the
Plan “but
that is not quite how things work in practice … there is a certain
expectation
373
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 29 August
2003, ‘Iraq’.
374
Telegram 9
CPA(South) to FCO London, 1 September 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What
Needs to be Done’.
375
Telegram 10
CPA(South) to FCO London, 1 September 2003, ‘An Emergency Plan for
Essential
Services in
Southern Iraq’.
116