6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
607.
Adm Boyce also
spoke to Gen Myers on 11 March.206
He reported
that, following
his visits
to Op TELIC theatre, and discussions with commanders, units were
ready and
people
would be deployed by 19 March.
608.
Gen Myers
indicated that he had told Gen Franks to work the “no UK
option”.
609.
The minutes
from the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 12 March stated that
Secretary
Rumsfeld
had spoken publicly about the possibility of the US commencing
action
“without
the UK at her side”.207
The
political decision to commit UK forces to Phases III
and IV had
“not yet been made, though planning continued as directed by
HMG”.
610.
In response to
the request for a statement on the basis for his assurance
to
Mr Blair
that the US plan for the invasion represented a “winning concept”,
Lord Boyce
wrote:
“The threat
was carefully assessed, including taking into account the
possible
deployment
of CW/BW weapons by Saddam, and measured against the
capability
of the
Coalition Forces. There was complete confidence from CENTCOM
and
ourselves
that Iraqi forces could be defeated.”208
611.
Lord Boyce’s
statement in respect of Phase IV is addressed in Section
6.5.
612.
Asked whether
Ministers had a clear sense of how important the UK
contribution
had become
to the campaign plan, Lord Boyce told the Inquiry: “I think so
…”209
613.
Lord Boyce
added that his personal view was that the US could not have
begun
the
military campaign without the UK contribution: Secretary Rumsfeld’s
comments that
the US
could manage on its own were right, but the US would not have
managed on
614.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry:
“… as far
as the fighting phase is concerned we were satisfied we were there.
As far
as the
aftermath planning was concerned, we thought we had something which
was
going to
cope with, as far as our imagination allowed us to look; our
imaginations
didn’t
basically go wide enough … to what actually transpired when the
time came.”211
615.
The DIS
produced a Memorandum on the “post-Saddam” political and
security
environment
Coalition Forces were likely to encounter in Basra City on 11
March.212
206
Minute
Zambellas to CDS, 12 March 2003, ‘Record of CDS/CJCS Telephone
Call: 11 Mar 2003’.
207
Minutes, 12
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
208
Statement,
7 January 2011.
209
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 62.
210
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 63.
211
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 99.
212
Paper DIS,
11 March 2003, ‘Basra: Post Saddam Governance’.
483