The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
477.
Lord Turnbull
told the Inquiry that “the presentation to … Cabinet was still –
nothing
was
inevitable. We are pressing the UN option. No decisions on military
action, whereas
you can see
that, at another level, the decisions on military action were
hardening up
478.
In response
to the briefing to the Security Council by Dr Blix
and
Dr ElBaradei
on 9 January, Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that
members
of the Security
Council wanted time for the inspectors to reach a
view.
479.
As agreed on
19 December, Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei gave an informal
update of
their
assessment of the Iraqi declaration and the progress of inspection
activities to the
members of
the Security Council on 9 January.164
Dr Blix
understood that the meeting
was
intended to allow members of the Council to comment on Iraq’s
declaration.
480.
Dr Blix
stated that, if UNMOVIC had found a “smoking gun” or if there had
been
any
impediment to their inspections, it would have been reported to the
Council. Iraqi
officials
had “sought to construe the prompt access given to inspection teams
and the
fact that
no weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items have been
found
as
confirmation” that there were none in Iraq; but the matter was “not
… that simple”.
Prompt
access was “an indispensible element of transparency” as part of a
process
of peaceful
disarmament, but it was:
“… by no
means sufficient to give confidence that nothing is hidden in a
large
country
with an earlier record of avoiding disclosures. Iraq is very
familiar with the
fact that
only declarations supported by evidence, will give confidence about
the
elimination
of weapons. In this respect we have not so far made
progress.”
481.
Commenting on
the “issues on which doubts exist as to whether all
proscribed
items or
activities had been eliminated”, identified by UNSCOM and the
Amorim report
in 1999
(see Section 1.1), Dr Blix added that UNMOVIC was “not bound
by every
conclusion
in these reports”. But they did give Iraq a “clear idea of
questions, which
need to be
answered and of doubts, which must be dispelled by very active
efforts”.
His “overall
impression” remained that Iraq’s declaration was “rich in volume
but poor
in new
information” and “practically devoid of new evidence on such
issues”.
482.
Dr Blix
said that “to create confidence that it has no more weapons of
mass
destruction
or proscribed activities relating to such weapons, Iraq must
present
credible
evidence”. That could be “of the most varied kind”, including
“interviews by
knowledgeable
persons who are not subjected to intimidation”. He had “not
asserted …
that
proscribed items or activities” existed; but if they did “Iraq
should present them
163
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, page 15.
164
UNMOVIC,
Briefing
the Security Council, 9 January 2003: Inspections in Iraq and a
further assessment
of Iraq’s
weapons declaration.
86