12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
•
the Iraqi
Government has the means, including its own defense and
police
forces, to
assume its responsibility for external and internal security,
including
policing of
its borders;
•
…
•
the roles
and accountabilities of organizations providing security are
clearly
defined
within a legal framework which governs, inter
alia, the
ownership of
weapons.”
343.
The paper
stated that CPA and CJTF‑7 activity had “often been driven
by
the
short‑term requirement to address pressing security needs” and
highlighted
weaknesses:
“•
We have not
designed our security sector development program based on
a
thorough
conflict assessment;
•
There is no
overarching security vision for Iraq that joins up short‑term
current
activities
with long‑term goals;
•
We are
focusing on building tactical and operational capabilities – the
building
of Iraqi
governance and oversight capacity is proceeding more
slowly;
•
Local
ownership of the Security Sector Reform process and policy is in
its
infancy;
•
We are
focusing on ‘hard’ security force development with limited
attention being
paid to
building ‘soft’ Iraqi capacity to prevent or manage
conflicts.”
344.
The paper
assessed each element of the security sector before discussing
its
overall
governance and accountability. Although the long‑term aim for the
NIA was a
focus on
external security, it was likely that it would be employed on
internal security and
so a legal
framework for that was needed. The ICDC would become an army
reserve.
The paper
also mentioned plans to develop an Iraqi Coastal Defence capability
and an
aviation
element for transportation and medical evacuation by autumn 2004.
All that
would be
organised by a Joint Forces Headquarters which would be established
by
June 2004.
345.
The desired
end state for the IPS was a “single nation‑wide police service
that
combines
centralized standards and policies with local accountability … Its
85,000
officers
will be well‑trained through a combination of basic mandate
training, mentoring,
and
specialist and leadership training”. The paper highlighted that the
IPS was being
developed
whilst it was in the front line fighting the insurgency
campaign.
346.
Problems with
individual ministerial capacity to manage the FPS were
also
identified.
133