4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
179.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that:
•
Sir Richard
told Mr Blair that Dr Blix “knew he was being ‘cat and
moused’
but he was
not on a mission. He was sure that Saddam was lying but he
had
to
establish that for himself. C felt that we had a better chance of
finding the
breaches
than the US.”
•
Mr Blair
had said, “half in jest”, “My future is in your
hands.”
•
“The
nightmare scenario, or one of them, was a discovery that was
sufficient for
the US but
not for us.”
•
“C said the
other risk was that we found the evidence of the breach before
the
US was
ready to go to war … if the inspectors had another month with
genuine
access, the
picture would be pretty clear. We were now pushing the line
that
they needed
time and space to do the job.”73
180.
Asked about
Mr Blair’s comment that his fate was in Sir Richard Dearlove’s
hands,
Sir Richard
told the Inquiry that he thought Mr Blair “was beginning to
understand that he
was in a
tough position vis-a-vis the inspection issue”.74
The UK’s
objectives were published in a Written Ministerial Statement by
Mr Straw on
Mr Straw
stated that the “prime objective” was:
“… to rid
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their
associated
programmes
and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles …
as
set out in
UNSCRs. This would reduce Iraq’s ability to threaten its neighbours
and
the region,
and prevent Iraq using WMD against its own people. UNSCRs
also
require
Iraq to renounce terrorism, and return captured Kuwaitis and
property taken
from Kuwait.”
Mr Straw
also stated:
“Success in
achieving our prime objective should help deter the proliferation
of WMD
and BM more
generally.”
181.
In his
informal briefing for the Security Council on 9 January, Dr Blix
made
clear that
he needed more information from Iraq.
73
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
74
Private
hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 76-77.
75
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2003, columns 4-6WS.
323