The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
in the lead
without appropriate funding and resources … We must be
prepared,
however, to
make some difficult decisions across Whitehall including,
perhaps,
transferring
leadership for IPS reform from the FCO to the MOD and
subsequently
restricting
IPA effort to developing certain IPS specialist functions. There is
further
concern,
which I share, that the UK model of policing is not necessarily the
most
appropriate
for the Iraqis. A gendarmerie model might be more
suitable.”
869.
Mr Stuart
Innes, British Consul General Basra, sent an eGram on
3 May 2005
reporting a
meeting he had held with Maj Gen Riley and DCC Smith a
day earlier.833
Mr Innes
stated that Maj Gen Riley had “said that SSR was now the
main focus of the
UK’s
military efforts in MND(SE)” and that the IPS programme required
greater attention
if
responsibility for security was to be handed to the ISF by
October.
870.
On 5 May 2005,
Maj Gen Wall wrote to Lt Gen Fry about the 2 May
meeting,
stating
that the FCO’s eGram provided “a partial explanation of the
proposed way
ahead”
which was “open to misinterpretation”.834
On the
increase of military support
he wrote:
“The lead
for police reform remains with the FCO. The military continue to
fulfil a
supporting
and co‑ordination role with greater planning
responsibility.
“No
additional UK military resources are required, and none will be
‘fixed’ if there
is an
opportunity to reduce force levels … Nor does it require resources
being
redirected
from existing tasks.
“Military
assistance to the Iraqi Army will remain the Division’s main
effort; support
to the
IPS is a lower priority.”
871.
DCC Smith
became the UK Chief Police Adviser in Iraq in May 2005, a role
that
combined
the two previous Senior Police Adviser positions in Baghdad and
Basra. He
told the
Inquiry:
“… part of
my remit to go to Baghdad was to increase UK influence at a
strategic
level,
which had for different reasons … dropped off since the time that
[DCC]
Doug Brand
was there.”835
872.
On 15 May, DCC
Smith produced a report of his review of UK policing
support
to the
development of the IPS.836
His report
described UK efforts in both Baghdad and
Basra;
those recommendations relating to policing in Baghdad are discussed
earlier in
833
eGram
3797/05 Basra to FCO, 3 May 2005, ‘Iraq: SSR: Police in the
South’.
834
Minute
DCJO(Ops) to DCDS(C), 5 May 2005, ‘Military Support to Iraqi Police
Service Training’.
835
Public
hearing, 21 July 2010, page 20.
836
Paper
Smith, 15 May 2005, ‘Next Steps on Policing – Review’ attaching
Smith, [undated], ‘Iraqi Police
Service –
Development Strategy’.
254