8 | The invasion

480. On 30 May, PJHQ concluded that the UK “decision action cycle was slower and

less well informed than it needed to be”.311 Differences in US and UK structures had

contributed to that.

481. PJHQ recommended that influencing the US would best be achieved through

UK personnel developing strong personal links – and leverage – in US headquarters,

including co-locating the UK Joint Commander with the US Combined Forces Command

in all future operations, maintaining “permanent liaison in strength with CENTCOM”, and

establishing an “early UK presence with other Combatant Commands in the build up to

an operation”.

482. PJHQ also concluded that the UK had “had a great deal of influence over the

conduct of the air campaign at the operational/tactical level”.

483. Influence at the strategic level had, however, been “reduced by the different US

and UK C2 [command and control] systems”, where US political direction went direct to

General Franks rather than through the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

484. PJHQ recommended that the differences between the UK and US military

structures had to be recognised and the UK should review what had been achieved and

how best the UK might influence future US campaign plans.

485. In October, Maj Gen Brims wrote in his post-operation report that the UK had

influenced the US only at the tactical level, although the deployment of AM Burridge

had gone some way to ensuring influence at Lt Gen McKiernan’s level.312

486. In a report dated 17 October, the DOC judged that “the provision of Liaison Officers

in key locations in the US military chain of command played a significant role in securing

a degree of influence with the US”.313

487. The DOC concluded:

“The UK must maintain the means of influencing the policy, planning and conduct of

a campaign in a Coalition context, specifically with the US, at an early enough stage

to have an effect.”

488. Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge told the Inquiry that the decision to compress

the timing of the air campaign to coincide with the land campaign had been taken

to allow the Coalition to deal with the strategic risks simultaneously, and the UK had

encouraged that.314

311 Minute CJO to DOC, 30 May 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – Phase III Top 10 Lessons Identified’ attaching

Annex C.

312 Report [MOD], 6 October 2003, ‘Post Operation Report – Version 2 Operation TELIC’.

313 Report Directorate of Operational Capability, 17 October 2003, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study’.

314 Public hearing, 8 December 2009, page 48.

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