14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
1127.
According to
the official, this was achieved through a programme of
“compartmentalisation”
which was under way and should be in place within seven
weeks
for all
personnel at BAS or Shaibah Logistics Base (SLB). It was estimated
that that
would
reduce the overall threat by 60 percent.
1128.
It would cost
“approximately $130m” to replace all tented accommodation
with
containerised
accommodation throughout MND(SE) and it would take “about
12 months”
to
complete. That would also have implications for the timeframe
within which the
UK could
withdraw from SLB. The official advised that it was “arguable
whether it
would
result in net reduction in risk to our people (though it might
overcome some
presentational
issues)”.
1129.
The official
stated:
“In the
longer term, anticipating an increasingly serious IDF threat and
recognising
quality of
life, we are also examining the options for providing Tier 2 or
Tier 3
accommodation
for the enduring proportion of the force (beyond 2008). Initial
work
indicates
that hardened accommodation for a reduced force would cost
some
$60m to
implement.”
1130.
The official
wrote that there was a need “to keep the threat posed to date by
IDF
attacks in
perspective to the wider challenges faced by MND(SE)”. There had
been
two UK
personnel595
and one US
State Department employee killed by IDF, all since
1 August
2006, compared with 25 fatalities by direct fire and 27 by IEDs.
IEDs were still
considered
“to be the greatest challenge”. The official advised that, despite
that, “recent
experience”
had suggested IDF attacks were “becoming more
accurate”.
1131.
The official
concluded that the incremental force protection plan in hand
would:
“…
ameliorate but not eliminate the risk. More could be done, but
would mean
delay and
significant additional cost. There is a case to be made for
hardened
accommodation
for our longer term residual presence, and work is in hand
to
define this.”
1132.
A manuscript
comment on the paper indicated that Mr Browne noted the
advice
1133.
The MOD told
the Inquiry that in October 2006 US National Guard
attack
helicopters
were deployed to Basra for an extended period to provide a
deterrent to the
increasing
levels of IDF being experienced.597
1134.
On 29
November, Lieutenant General Nicholas Houghton, CJO, briefed
the
Chiefs of
Staff on “continued efforts” to counter the IDF threat in
Basra.598
The level
of
595
Corporal
Matthew Cornish and Lance Corporal Dennis Brady.
596
Manuscript
comment
Browne on Minute PJHQ [junior official] to APS/SofS [MOD], 10
October 2006,
‘Iraq:
Force Protection’.
597
Paper
[MOD], 20 January 2011, ‘Iraq Inquiry: Request for
Evidence’.
598
Minutes, 29
November 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
193