3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
248.
Sir John
Holmes reported that he had been informed that little more had
been
discussed
between Presidents Putin and Chirac than had appeared in the
declaration;
the report
in Der
Spiegel was
“extravagant”; and France had never raised the idea
of UN peacekeeping
forces.70
249.
Mr Straw
set out a detailed case for confronting the challenge posed by
Iraq
in a speech
to the International Institute for Strategic Studies on 11
February.
250.
In a speech
made at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
on
11 February,
Mr Straw set out “the disturbing outcome of a failure to act
decisively to
secure
Iraq’s disarmament” and the need, “for the sake of the Iraqi
people, long-term
stability
in the Middle East, the credibility of the UN and the cause of
international law
and
collective security”, to confront the challenge posed by
Iraq.71
251.
Mr Straw
argued that international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD
were
the
“crucial strategic questions of our time” and the response to those
threats would
“determine
the stability of the world for generations to come”. That was “an
awesome
responsibility”
which called for “courageous leadership” and required “the vision
and
foresight
to act decisively and – if necessary – with military force before
our worst
nightmares
are realised”.
252.
Saddam
Hussein’s regime typified the threat in which rogue regimes
sheltered
individuals
plotting “mayhem and mass murder in our streets”. Mr Straw
stated:
“Weapons of
mass destruction have been a central pillar of Saddam’s
dictatorship
since the
1980s. He has amassed poisons and viruses both to suppress his
own
people, and
to threaten his neighbours. He has relentlessly pursued his
ultimate
ambition,
the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability, in flagrant
disregard
of SCRs
and Iraq’s obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state under
the
Non-Proliferation
Treaty. His pursuit of these weapons has lain at the
heart
of the UN’s
stand-off with Iraq for the past 12 years.”
253.
Examining “six
of the most commonly expressed arguments about the
UK Government’s
approach”, Mr Straw argued that:
•
The Iraqi
threat to Europe and the US was not “overstated”. Resolution
1441
recognised the “singular menace” from Iraq’s weapons of
mass
destruction.
UNSCOM had had some successes, including overseeing
the
destruction
of “significant quantities” of weaponry, but when the inspectors
left
in 1998, it
was “clear that the regime continued to hold vast stocks of
deadly
weaponry”.
The absence of inspectors since 1998 had “allowed Saddam
to
70
Telegram 77
Paris to FCO London, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Chirac and Putin in
Paris’.
71
The
National Archives, 11 February 2003, Iraq: A
challenge we must confront.
225