3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
161.
The debate
on Iraq in the US continued throughout August.
162.
A speech by
Vice President Cheney on 26 August fuelled that
debate.
163.
In a press
conference with Secretary Rumsfeld at Crawford on 21 August,
about
security
and defence issues, President Bush was asked whether the US had
the
capacity to
“go to war with Saddam” alone; and whether, given remarks by
General
Franks that
he was drawing up war plans to provide credible options, the
American
people
should conclude that a decision was imminent.53
164.
In response to
the first question, Secretary Rumsfeld described the
intense
speculation
about Iraq as “frenzy”; President Bush said that he would be
consulting
allies and
Congress about how to secure peace. In response to the second
question,
President
Bush said only that the US had to be prepared to use its military
and other
assets to
“keep the peace” in the face of an unstable world and a global
terrorist
network
that might strike anywhere; and that General Franks’ job was to
prepare
for contingencies.
165.
In an article
in the New York
Times on 25 August,
Mr James Baker, former US
Secretary
of State, called for “a simple and straightforward resolution
requiring that Iraq
submit to
intrusive inspections anytime, anywhere, with no exceptions, and
authorizing
all
necessary means to enforce it”.54
166.
In his memoir,
Vice President Cheney wrote that the White House had been
talking
about the
idea of an “aggressive” inspection regime, advanced by
Dr Rice, which was
so
intrusive it might result in toppling Saddam
Hussein.55
It had been
discussed by the
President
and Mr Blair, but he (Vice President Cheney) “didn’t buy it”.
He had therefore
decided to
press the issue in his speech on the threat from terrorism to a
National
Conference
of the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 26 August.
167.
In the speech,
Vice President Cheney stated that Saddam Hussein had “made
a
science out
of deceiving the international community”. Vice President Cheney
stated
that there
was no doubt that Saddam Hussein had WMD and Iraq was enhancing
its
capabilities.
He concluded: “the risk of inaction is far greater than the risk of
action”.
There was
“no assurance whatsoever” that inspections would produce
compliance
with UN
resolutions; on the contrary there was “a great danger that it
would provide
168.
In her memoir,
Dr Rice wrote that President Bush asked her to call Vice
President
Cheney
after his speech to say that the President hadn’t yet made a
decision. She had
53
The White
House, 21 August 2002, President
discusses security and defence issues.
54
New York
Times, 25 August
2002, The Right
Way to Change a Regime (James A
Baker III).
55
Cheney D
& Cheney L. In My Time:
A Personal and Political Memoir. Simon &
Schuster, 2011.
56
The White
House, 26 August 2002, Vice
President Speaks at VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars]
103rd National
Convention.
123