14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
995.
Lt Gen Fulton
advised Gen Walker that the view of “Customer Two”, the
Front
Line Commands,
was that the problems in managing a larger number of
recovered
Sea King
would “probably outweigh any advantage”. They thought the best way
to
“leverage
better performance” was to continue seeking to “fly the existing
aircraft harder
by
improving servicing, processes and spares delivery”.
996.
Customer Two
was keen to explore the potential merits of “running on
either
Puma or
Sea King” to achieve the Equipment Programme “stagger required to
introduce,
in
affordable tranches, a future new helicopter”.
997.
In his
post‑operation tour report on 18 January 2006,
Maj Gen Dutton wrote:
“The
importance of ISTAR platforms within this theatre cannot be
overstated.”530
998.
Maj Gen Dutton
referred to helicopters fitted with Broadsword capability. He
stated
that
[Helicopter Broadsword] was good but suffered availability
limitations as with all
aircraft in
theatre. Nimrod was also good but orientated towards [UK theatre
forces]531
and
therefore not dedicated to MND(SE). He highlighted the need to
maintain and
possibly
increase ISTAR coverage as the UK moved towards Operational
Overwatch.532
999.
Lieutenant
General Nicholas Houghton succeeded AM Torpy as CJO in
March
2006. On 3
March, he wrote to Gen Walker with the results of a Force
Level Review.533
1000.
The aviation
support to MND(SE) was provided by: five Merlin, five Sea
King,
three
[Helicopter Broadsword] and four Lynx. Lt Gen Houghton
wrote that there was
a
requirement for Merlin and Lynx to remain throughout Operational
Overwatch but
changes to
tasking lines and servicing routines enabled a reduction of two Sea
King as
an
“efficiency measure”. He highlighted the possibility of further
helicopter reductions
following
the anticipated transition to Provincial Iraqi Control in Maysan,
Muthanna and
Basra
provinces.
1001.
On ISTAR,
Lt Gen Houghton stated that “Full Motion Video” (FMV)
capability was
provided by
Nimrod (Iraq‑wide), [Helicopter Broadsword] (MND(SE)‑wide) and
Phoenix
(locally).
1002.
Phoenix would
again be withdrawn for the summer months and would not
be
replaced
with any UAV as Desert Hawk had proved “unsuitable”. There remained
a
shortfall
in persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR).
530
Report HQ
MND(SE), 18 January 2006, ‘Progress Report – Operation
TELIC’.
531
A cipher
has been used here for national security reasons.
532
Operational
Overwatch was a phase of transition where the UK would operate from
a reduced number
of MNF
bases to reduce profile while providing reinforcement to Iraqi
forces. That is addressed in
Section 9.4.
533
Minute CJO
to PSO/CDS, 3 March 2006, ‘Op TELIC Force Level Review – Feb
06’.
169