The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

64.  A subsequent telegram from Mr Collis highlighted that “any attack on the holy sites

is liable to have a major and lasting impact across the South”.32 That risk could be

mitigated by:

• making the operation an ISF, rather than MNF-I, one with Prime Minister Allawi

fronting political and media operations;

• explaining the purpose of such action to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and

Mr Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General;

• launching a major humanitarian operation in Najaf; and

• re-launching economic reconstruction across the South.

65.  Maj Gen Rollo supported all of those points.

66.  Mr Collis advised that “high level contact from London to take Allawi and the

Americans through our concerns” would make sense.

67.  A discussion between Cabinet Office and No.10 officials on 11 August concluded:

“The security situation was bad, both in the Sunni and Shia areas. While the

fighting in Shia areas currently had greater profile, the problems in the Sunni areas

were more strategically significant … The policy question was how we suggested

Allawi should deal with the problems, particularly in Najaf. Generally, the view of

the meeting was that action did need to be taken against Muqtada al-Sadr (MAS),

but that there were significant risks, military and political, which would need to be

managed … If they [the ISF] were not ready, any operation risked either failing or

drawing in coalition forces.”33

68.  Officials also observed that “while Allawi was performing relatively well, the Iraqi

Interim Government (IIG) remained highly dependent on him for drive and direction”.

69.  On 11 August, a briefing paper for Mr Blair in advance of a telephone call with

President Bush stated that, while the main strategic challenge remained the violence

in the Sunni areas, the immediate issue was addressing the situation in Najaf and its

spread across southern Iraq.34

70.  Muqtada al-Sadr remained a threat that would need to be “dealt with … probably

sooner rather than later” although he was not considered to pose a strategic threat as

he had earlier in the year.

71.  The brief said that any decision to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr was for Prime Minister

Allawi to take, and the MNF-I would need to support that decision. It seemed likely that

no action would be taken before the National Conference. The brief suggested that

32  Telegram 103 Basra to FCO London, 11 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Security and Najaf’.

33  Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Fergusson, 11 August 2004, ‘Iraq’.

34  Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 11 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Phone Call with President Bush’.

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