The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1066.
The MOD was
also concerned that:
“Lack of
clarity in US thinking about possible triggers for military action
needs to be
resolved
quickly, particularly in relation to the No‑Fly
Zones.”
1067.
If a Coalition
aircraft was shot down, it would, “under long‑standing plans,
trigger
a massive
US response”, which the US might use to trigger a wider
campaign.
1068.
Mr Hoon
recommended working “quickly to reach an agreed US/UK view
on
triggers …
well before we are confronted with it in practice”, and explaining
to the US
that
hostility in the No‑Fly Zones should be met only by “self‑defence
responses”.
1069.
Mr Watkins
also drew attention to the importance of planning for the
“aftermath”
of military
action: “This needs to guide thinking on the conflict phase, for
all sorts of
reasons”.
Mr Hoon believed that the UK should: “Continue trying to
influence US thinking
on the
aftermath, recognising that this is not something which can be
neatly separated
from any
conflict phase”.
1070.
Copies of
Mr Watkins’ letter were sent to the Private Offices of
Mr Straw and
Mr Brown,
and to Mr Bowen.
1071.
The discussion
within the UK Government on the timetable and triggers
for military
action following the adoption of resolution 1441 is addressed
in
Sections 3.6 and
5.
1072.
Adm Boyce
decided on 20 November that it would be premature to
discuss
alternative
options with the US while the UK was still trying to force a
decision from
Turkey. The
northern option remained the firm preference of the Chiefs
of Staff.
1073.
The Chiefs
of Staff also asked Lt Gen Reith to look at the option
of
providing
two UK brigades.
1074.
On 20
November, the Chiefs of Staff considered the options identified
by
Lt Gen Reith
on 18 November.418
1075.
The Chiefs of
Staff were informed that the US had offered the UK a light
brigade,
but that
was not suitable for the operation in the North.
Lt Gen Reith would examine
other
options including the provision of two UK triangular
brigades.
1076.
Adm Boyce
asked for:
•
further
advice on the northern force structure, including the employment of
the
ARRC;
and
•
“… further
clarification on timelines before considering the Southern
COAs.”
418
Minutes, 20
November 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
336