The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

72. Lt Gen Reith advised:

“Phase IV would need to begin at the same time as any offensive operations.

There was a need for PJHQ to take ownership of Phase IV planning, which should

include OGD [other government department] input. The US were standing up JTF- 4

[Joint Task Force 4, the post-conflict planning unit in CENTCOM], which would be

responsible for US Phase IV planning; UK staff were to be embedded.”

73. Co-ordination of Phase IV planning from mid-January is addressed in Section 6.5.

74. Reporting on the meeting to Mr Straw’s Private Office, Mr William Ehrman, FCO

Director General Defence and Intelligence,15 recorded that he had stressed:

“… there should be no assumption of a political decision to authorise force in

the near future … If Ministers agreed the deployment proposed, it needed to be

clear that it was part of force on mind, and it should not set sail with a use it or

lose it presumption. Sustainability needed to be in any plan … Chiefs accepted

these points.”16

75. Mr Desmond Bowen, Deputy Head of OD Sec, reported the discussion to

Sir David Manning.17

76. The military planning assumed a “decision date of 15 February and the start of

hostilities in very early March”. The UK was being offered an amphibious role at the start

of hostilities. Thereafter, US forces would move north while the UK “took on stabilisation

of a southern sector which would eventually include Basra”.

77. Mr Bowen concluded:

“While we are now getting more clarity about the shape of US military intentions

in an attack on Iraq, and the potential UK role, precious little thought has gone into

aftermath planning … if the UK is to take on an area of responsibility for stabilisation

operations, a lot of preparatory work is needed urgently. MOD have in mind to

engage … FCO, DFID & DTI [Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for

International Development and the Department for Trade and Industry] on this.”

78. Sir David Manning sent Mr Bowen’s report to Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of

Staff. Sir David wrote that he had asked Adm Boyce to cover the issues when he briefed

Mr Blair – with the Chiefs of Staff – the following week. Mr John Scarlett, the Chairman

of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), should also be asked to attend.18

15 The post was previously titled Deputy Under Secretary Defence and Intelligence.

16 Letter Ehrman to Private Secretary [FCO], 8 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Aspects’.

17 Minute Bowen to Manning, 8 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff Meeting on 9 [sic] January’.

18 Manuscript comment Manning to Powell, 10 January 2003, on Minute Bowen to Manning,

8 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff meeting on 9 [sic] January’.

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