The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
26.
The
briefing listed strategic decisions needed “very soon so that
planning can
proceed”:
•
how to
establish a secure environment;
•
how to meet
the basic needs of the Iraqi people;
•
the level
of ambition for political reform;
•
the extent
to which economic reform should be left to the
International
Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; and
•
the
environmental clean-up plan.
27.
The follow-up
to the 6 November US/UK/Australia post-conflict talks in
Washington
took place
on 22 January.
28.
In his record
of the 17 January meeting of the AHGI, Mr Jim Drummond,
Assistant
Head
(Foreign Affairs) OD Sec, stated that preparations for the talks
were on track and
that the UK
had supplied a number of papers on the main issues.9
The US had
not, so
far, shared
any papers with the UK.
29.
Mr Drummond
also stated that the MOD had started its own detailed
aftermath
planning,
“just in case UK forces ended up controlling a part of Iraq”. The
questions
raised
would be used “to give a practical edge to the Washington
discussions”.
30.
On 17 January,
Mr Dominick Chilcott, FCO Middle East Department
(MED),
submitted
an “Annotated agenda/overarching paper” to
Mr Straw.10
31.
In the
covering minute, Mr Chilcott sought Mr Straw’s agreement
that UK officials
should
“argue for following a UN, rather than a unilateral, American-led,
route on day-
after
issues” and “make clear that we need broad agreement soon on these
issues, so
that we can
clarify the role which UK forces will play”. Mr Chilcott
reported that MOD
officials
were content with that approach.
32.
Mr Chilcott
explained that the UK had shared a number of papers on
post-conflict
issues with
the US, but had received very little in return:
“We had
hoped that by now US thinking would be beginning to converge.
But
differences
between departments remain as stark as before. At one end of
the
spectrum,
the Pentagon, who regard the UN as irredeemably incompetent,
advocate
the US
leading a day-after operation, co-opting willing allies for an
extended period,
until a new
Iraqi government is ready to take over. At the other end sit the
State
Department
who favour an internationalist approach with UN blessing. The
NSC
are
somewhere in the middle. CENTCOM [Central Command] have set up a
large
military
team to work up plans for taking over the government of Iraq. The
risk is
9
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 21 January 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on
Iraq’.
10
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day-After Issues’.
312