The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
increase
the chance that he [President Bush] will take heed of the arguments
in your
Note and
adjust his policy.”
472.
Sir David
Manning told the Inquiry that he had expected a further meeting
with
Dr Rice
and others in the NSC the following morning.186
To his
surprise, he was instead
invited to
meet President Bush, and he and Dr Rice had a discussion with
President
Bush which
lasted 30 or 40 minutes. President Bush had been briefed on the
discussion
the
previous evening and had “clearly read and studied the Prime
Minister’s Note”.
Sir David
had been asked to “go over [it] again”; and he had “repeated that
it was
impossible
for the United Kingdom to take part in any action against Iraq
unless it were
through the
United Nations. This was our preference but it was also the
political reality.”
473.
In his record
of the discussion with President Bush, Sir David Manning wrote
that
he had said
that Mr Blair agreed Saddam Hussein had to go:
“There was
no difference about ends [regime change], but means was an
issue.
Iraq was
politically very difficult … We were not bidding for a role. We
knew that
the US
could do the job alone. That would be fine by you if that was the
President’s
preference,
in which case we would lend moral support. But if he wanted more
…
from us, he
had to understand the politics from your
perspective.”187
474.
Sir David
Manning reported that President Bush had been “struck by
your
[Mr Blair’s]
emphasis on the need for an ultimatum” which the Administration
would
need to
think through.
475.
Sir David told
President Bush that if he:
“…
preferred to work with a coalition, the UN route was the way to
construct it.
A tough,
time-bound, ultimatum to Saddam at the end of the process would
put
him at a
serious disadvantage while rallying the International community for
action
… I thought
you had no difficulty with the idea of pre-emption … It was
entirely
understandable
that we should try to pre-empt him. But it was vital to make
the
public case
… Awkward and time-consuming though it might be, this was the
route
calculated
to help European leaders bring their publics and parliaments in
support …
[President]
Bush should be trying to catch all our fingers in the UN
mangle.”
476.
Sir David
reported that President Bush had understood the point and the
“issue
he had to
reflect on now was ‘how to set the stage’ so that we could pursue
the goal
together of
getting rid of Saddam”.
477.
Sir David’s
report concluded that President Bush was keen to discuss the
Note
with Mr
Blair on the telephone on 31 July; and that Mr Blair should go to
Washington in
September.
Sir David advised: “I do not think this [the UN and an ultimatum]
is yet a lost
cause. My
advice is that you should push it very hard.” President Bush “might
decide
186
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 18-19.
187
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
President Bush’.
82