9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
181.
Sir David
emphasised that:
“Bush needs
to hear the alarm now. He needs to focus, and to galvanise action,
if
we are not
to find ourselves increasingly embattled in Iraq and unable to
achieve a
successful
post-war settlement.”
182.
The weekly
meeting of Cabinet took place before Mr Blair and President
Bush
spoke on 3
July. In the course of the meeting Mr Straw, Baroness Amos and
Mr Hoon all
emphasised
that security was the main issue.73
183.
Mr Hoon
identified “greater organisation” in anti-Coalition forces and said
that the
vicious
circle of opposition to the Coalition, which prevented improvements
to the life of
the average
Iraqi citizen, must be broken.
184.
Mr Blair
concluded that we should make CPA(South) into “a model”.
Political
progress
was essential to the stability of Iraq.
185.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by video conference on 3
July.74
186.
Mr Hoon,
Gen Walker, Mr Jonathan Powell and Sir David Manning joined
from
London,
along with key White House officials, Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice
President
Cheney in
the US. Ambassador Bremer, Mr Sawers and General Ricardo
Sanchez
(Commander
of CJTF-7) dialled in from Iraq.
187.
Mr Blair
began by congratulating Ambassador Bremer on the
“remarkable
performance”
of the CPA. He then set out areas of concern:
•
Security.
This was hampering CPA efforts at reconstruction; what more did
the
CPA
need?
•
Reconstruction.
The power and water infrastructure needed to be
rebuilt
urgently;
were there particular obstacles that needed to be
removed?
•
Communications.
It was essential to improve the CPA’s capacity to
communicate
with the
people of Iraq.
•
WMD. The
search needed to be redoubled and the atrocities of the
Saddam
regime
documented and publicised.
•
Politics.
Was the political process on track?
188.
On security,
Mr Blair asked Mr Sawers and Ambassador Bremer to draw up
a
list of
their requirements, telling them “whatever they needed, we would do
our utmost
to provide”
and reiterating that the UK would “do our level best to meet any
demand
for
additional resources”. Mr Blair added that if there were any
obstacles that needed
clearing,
Mr Sawers and Ambassador Bremer should tell him.
73
Cabinet
Conclusions, 3 July 2003.
74
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 3 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Video-Conference with President Bush,
3
July’.
235