12.1 | Security Sector Reform

104. Mr Blunkett was said to be “disappointed” by that response and told Mr Blair that

he was “very keen to make his own contribution”. He instructed his officials to make

contact with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) to explore the possibilities,

which they did on 14 April.

105. Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan, the lead on international affairs for ACPO,

responded:

“ACPO and I are very keen to play a full and appropriate part in supporting the UK’s

contribution to liberating the people of Iraq. The form of assistance we can provide

depends on the mission envisaged and crucially clear political direction.”79

106. Mr Blunkett relayed CC Kernaghan’s offer to Mr Straw, confirming his own

“commitment to the rehabilitation of Iraq, and in particular to the principle of the provision

of UK policing assistance as soon as practicable”.80 Mr Blunkett emphasised that both

CC Kernaghan and he were “ready and willing to engage with you in working towards

identifying civilian policing requirements in Iraq and how they might best be met”.

107. CC Kernaghan wrote to Mr Pattison, offering his services and suggesting that the

FCO might wish to convene a meeting to bring together the key players from the FCO,

Home Office and relevant policing interests to ensure a co‑ordinated approach.81 He had

already discussed the matter with the Chief Constable of the MOD police and they were

“agreed that an integrated response between all elements of the UK police service is the

best approach”.

108. On 23 April, a meeting between the FCO, the Home Office, the MOD and ACPO

agreed that the MOD police would deploy two officers – at the rank of Superintendent

and either Inspector or Chief Inspector – “to enhance the police advice available to

GOC [General Officer Commanding] 1 UK Armoured Division” and that the FCO would

try to place a UK Chief Inspector inside the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian

Assistance (ORHA).82 It was confirmed that, in the meantime, CC Kernaghan should

visit Iraq to gather information “to enable FCO/ACPO/Home Office to plan the UK’s

contribution”.

109. CC Kernaghan’s record of the meeting concluded that “at this point in time there is

no clear shared vision of the future but instead a strong determination by the agencies

represented to provide meaningful support based on a professional assessment of

the situation”.

79 Email Kernaghan to Home Office [junior official], 15 April 2003, ‘Potential UK Civil Police Involvement

in Iraq’.

80 Minute Blunkett to Straw, 16 April 2003, ‘UK Police Assistance for Iraq’.

81 Letter Kernaghan to Pattison, 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq and the UK Police Service’.

82 Email Kernaghan to Pattison, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq and the UK Police Service – Meeting 23/4/03’.

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