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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“impervious” to the UK’s arguments, although that “could still change if it looks as if
we might secure the nine votes and avoid Russian and Chinese vetoes”.
118.  Sir John reported that France’s strategy remained:
“(a) to persuade us not to go for a vote, (b) if this did not work, to stop us from
securing nine votes, and (c) if there are nine votes, to ensure that they have Russian
and Chinese company in vetoing.”
119.  France was “on the diplomatic offensive”. Mr Dominique de Villepin, the French
Foreign Minister, was visiting Angola, Cameroon and Guinea and President Chirac was
“canvassing support” for a Security Council meeting at Head of State level for a vote
on Iraq.
120.  Sir John commented:
“Although the French have still so far steered clear of saying in so many words that
they will veto, it is hard to interpret their comments and approach in any other way …
It is getting increasingly difficult for the French to backtrack now, having built up so
many expectations domestically and internationally. Whilst we are both fully engaged
in our respective lobbying campaigns there is little we can say to them likely to have
much impact …
“I doubt that benchmarks and a little more time will do the trick … That said, the
dynamics may yet change this week … In any case, going to a vote without at least
some Prime Ministerial contact with Chirac would … be odd. If it looks as though we
have the nine votes and might persuade Russia and China not to vote, a serious
phone call would be well worth a try – if only to ease the way for co-operation in
the aftermath.”
121.  In a television interview on the evening of 10 March, President Chirac made
clear that France did not consider that the UN inspections had reached a “dead
end” and warned of the adverse consequences of unilateral US military action.
122.  Addressing the “most probable” scenario that evening, President Chirac
said that the revised resolution tabled by the UK, US and Spain on 7 March would
not secure the support of nine members of the Council. If, however, there was
a majority, France would “vote no”.
123.  Asked about his position, President Chirac replied that “regardless of the
circumstances”, France would vote “no” because “this evening” there were no
grounds for waging war to disarm Iraq.
124.  President Chirac also stated that if the inspectors reported that they were not
in a position to guarantee Iraq’s disarmament, war would become inevitable.
125.  In a television interview on the evening of 10 March, President Chirac argued
that a country with Iraq’s past and political structure was always dangerous, but it
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