The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
303.
On 5 October,
Lieutenant General Andrew Ridgway, the Chief of
Defence
Intelligence,
sent an account of his recent visit to Iraq to Gen Walker and
senior
304.
The report
highlighted the “very apparent deterioration in the security
situation in
Baghdad
over successive visits” and that sectarian tensions were at “an
unprecedented
level”. The
“best figures” Lt Gen Ridgway could obtain were that some 150
bodies,
mainly
Sunni Arabs, were being found per week. AQ-I and others had
benefited from the
resulting
backlash.
305.
Lt Gen Ridgway
wrote:
“Whichever
way you look at the metrics of the insurrection in terms of
attacks,
bombings,
killings, public opinion and so on, the clear conclusion is that
the security
situation
is getting progressively worse. This is occurring despite the
progress
with the
political process, the investment in infrastructure and the
significant
improvement
in the capability of the ISF … if the trend of the last two
years
continues
the conclusions must be that, unless we do something very
different, we
will get
progressively further away from the point where conditions are
conducive to
drawdown.
Indeed even a very significant improvement will not begin to get us
close
to this
sort of outcome.”
306.
On 5 October,
Mr Asquith sent advice to Mr Straw on key Iraq issues for
the
coming
three months and how to tackle them.140
He
wrote:
“We need to
keep the Sunni Arabs engaged in the political process by focusing
them
on the
sixty-two laws required by the Constitution to regulate basic
principles. Only
by being
represented in the Council of Representatives (the new National
Assembly)
will they
be able to influence the legislative content.”
307.
Mr Asquith
judged that: “Domination of the political scene (and TNA) by a
Shia
Islamist
and assertive Kurdish bloc has resulted in an imperfect
Constitution”, and
stressed
the need to build the centre ground.
308.
Other actions
identified by Mr Asquith included building the centre ground
in Iraqi
politics,
keeping the coalition together, securing a new Security Council
resolution,
building
relationships with key US players and improving Whitehall
mechanisms.
309.
Mr Asquith
advised that:
“The
creation of a small group of Ministers (Foreign, Defence and
International
Development
Secretaries) and senior officials … meeting on a regular
basis
(eg fortnightly)
might provide the opportunity to talk through complex and
key
139
Minute CDI
to CDS, 5 October 2005, ‘CDI’s visit to Iraq 26-30 Sep
05’.
140
Minute
Asquith to Straw, 5 October 2005, ‘Iraq: The Next Three
Months’.
540