6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
1077.
Adm Boyce “was
also clear that while the main effort was to force a decision
from
Tu[rkey] …
the time was not right to open up alternative planning options with
the US”.
1078.
The Chiefs of
Staff also discussed:
•
the debate
on potential triggers for military action;
•
the
possibility of the rapid collapse of the Iraqi regime without
military action; and
•
the need to
respond quickly to the formal US request for UK forces. That
would
be
“unspecific” and would refer to further discussions in
December.
1079.
In CENTCOM,
Maj Gen Wilson continued to tell his colleagues that the
UK was
“North,
North and North”, “but that it would be imprudent to dismiss other
options if the
Turkish
door were to remain closed indefinitely”.419
1080.
On 21
November, Mr Blair confirmed that the UK would provide
military
support to
the US if that was necessary.
1081.
Mr Blair
met Mr Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Leader of the Adalet ve
Kalkınma
Partisi
Justice and Development Party (AKP), in London on 20
November.420
Mr Blair
congratulated
Mr Erdoğan on his election victory, and in the context of
discussions on a
range of
issues, including UK support for EU membership for Turkey, the
record of the
meeting
states they agreed the UK and Turkey “should keep in close contact
over Iraq”.
1082.
In his
bilateral discussion with President Bush at the NATO Summit in
Prague
on 21
November, Mr Blair confirmed that the UK would support the US
militarily if
1083.
In response to
a request for his views on military planning, Mr Blair said
there was
a need to
be ready for military action early in the New Year and as soon as
possible after
it became
clear that there was a material breach.
1084.
In a meeting
with Mr Hoon, Secretary Rumsfeld suggested that the UK
should
look at
using its forces elsewhere than the North.422
1085.
Mr Hoon
replied that “deploying our forces to, say, Kuwait would affect
our
timelines”.
1086.
The meeting
agreed Adm Boyce’s suggestion that the UK “should keep
planning
with
CENTCOM for a northern operation, while looking at possible
fallbacks”.
419
Minute
Wilson to CJO, 20 November 2002, ‘Iraq Contingency Planning and
Related Issues’.
420
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 20 November 2002, ‘Turkey: Prime Minister’s
Meeting with Erdoğan,
20
November’.
421
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 21 November 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with President Bush,
21
November’.
422
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 22 November 2002, ‘Bilateral with Donald
Rumsfeld:
21 November
2002’.
337