The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
27.
US and UK
officials discussed draft resolutions on 15 and 16 September.
Mr Peter
Ricketts,
FCO Political Director, reported that the main differences between
them were;
a US demand
for comprehensive declarations and making failure to comply with
that
a “casus
belli”; detailed proposals for unfettered access for inspectors;
and “the ‘all
necessary
means’ issue”.8
28.
Sir David
Manning discussed developments with Dr Rice on 16
September.9
He stated
that the position was “very much better … than … eight weeks ago”;
and that
Mr Blair
was “pleased that the issue was now focused in the UN, where the
early signs
suggested
the debate was going well”. Saudi Arabia had announced that they
would
permit
overflights if there was a resolution authorising
action.
29.
Sir David
Manning reported that he had told Dr Rice:
•
The UK
would consider two resolutions, one dealing with Iraq’s WMD
and
one dealing
with other aspects of the Iraqi problem, including the
restoration
of Kuwaiti
property.
•
The UK was
still considering whether to demand that Saddam Hussein
should
make a
“Declaration about his WMD stocks”. There would be a
discussion
between
Mr Blair and Mr Straw the following day.
•
Mr Blair
would be “sympathetic” to the need for an effective and
intrusive
inspections
regime and the measures to ensure that, such as
protection
for UNMOVIC
and the role of P5 representatives.
•
On the
question of whether to seek “all necessary means” or accepting
language
specifying
“serious consequences”, there was the option of falling back on
the
Kosovo
model (taking independent action if ultimately the UN route
failed). It
was the
right way forward.
30.
The US and UK
Missions to the UN in New York produced a draft
“composite
resolution”
on 16 September, which Mr Straw and Sir Jeremy Greenstock
discussed
with Secretary
Powell later that day.10
31.
Secretary
Powell told Mr Straw that he had discussed the possibility of
an Iraqi letter
agreeing to
unconditional access for inspectors with Mr Kofi Annan,
Secretary‑General
of the UN,
“three times in the last 14 hours”. Mr Annan had made it clear
to Iraq that
there would
be a new resolution and there was nothing it could do to stop
it.
32.
Mr Straw
thought that “overall the argument was going well”. Egypt and
other
countries
were complaining about where an objective of regime change left
them,
but:
“Saddam Hussein had a choice, either complying with SCRs [Security
Council
8
Minute
Ricketts to Secretary of State [FCO], 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq: UN
Resolutions’.
9
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
10
Telegram
1729 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq:
Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation
with US Secretary of State, 16 September’.
206