3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
the
negotiations” on the second resolution, but they “might like a bit
more of the flavour
as we enter
the end game”. Events were “moving pretty fast” and they should not
be
“surprised”
if the guidance was “a little out of date by the time you read
it”.
368.
As agreed
by Mr Blair and Mr Straw, the UK’s draft tests were
circulated in
a meeting
of Security Council members late on 12 March where they attracted
a
mixed
response. It was recognised that the UK was making “a real effort”
to find
a way
forward; but there was “no breakthrough”.
369.
France,
Germany and Russia focused on UNMOVIC’s identification of
key
disarmament
tasks and a work programme, as required by resolution 1284
(1999).
370.
Dr Blix
said UNMOVIC would be seeking comments on its proposals
on
14 March.
371.
The UK
circulated its draft side statement setting out the six tests to a
meeting of
Security
Council members in New York on the evening of 12
March.118
The draft
omitted
an
identified date for a deadline and included the addition of a final
clause stating that:
“The United
Kingdom reserves its position if Iraq fails to take the steps
required of it.”
372.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told Council members that the UK “non-paper”,
setting
out six
tasks to be achieved in a 10-day timeline, responded to an approach
from the
undecided
six (U-6) looking for a way forward.119
373.
Sir Jeremy
said he had consulted Dr Blix and Dr Perricos, but the
list was the
responsibility
of the UK, which was:
“… anxious
to preserve the possibility of a peaceful solution and had
been
distressed
by the failure of the Security Council to find a formula around
which the
Council
could group without vetoes.
“I was
asking all Council members without exception if this was an
opportunity we
could take.
If there was traction we would be willing to consider dropping OP3
of our
draft
resolution. But if the Council did not see this as a way through,
the co-sponsors
would stick
with the current draft and the package was null and
void.
“There was
a placeholder in the non-paper for a date – 17 March remained
and
I had no
other date to offer. But clearly 17 March was approaching fast and
was
not
consistent with a 10 day timeline for the tests if the idea was
taken up. The
discussion
of dates would have to be set against the realities – there was no
great
scope for
moving to the right.
118
Telegram
429 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK
Side-Statement’.
119
Telegram
428 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK
Circulates Side-Statement’.
463