The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
were
briefed that the eventual move to provincial control would be based
on “complex,
inter‑dependent
conditions” that were not fully defined and would depend upon
the
development
of a national security framework and that, although military SSR
activity
in MND(SE)
was progressing well, the scope for significant military
disengagement
in 2005
would be limited. Military SSR was expected to be completed in
MND(SE) in
March 2006.
860.
Lt
Gen Fry highlighted that non‑military Iraqi capabilities,
especially the IPS, were
lagging
behind the Iraqi Army and stated:
“This
imbalance must be redressed not only to ward against an overly
dominant
IA [Iraqi
Army], but also to allow us to realise the potential military
dividend of our
efforts
with the IA.”
861.
Lt
Gen Fry suggested that the UK needed to:
•
influence
the development of a national policing strategy;
•
encourage
greater international involvement, particularly for
gendarmerie‑type
training;
•
develop IPS
leadership and niche capabilities; and
•
develop an
effective judiciary and prison system to support IPS
activity.
862.
Lt
Gen Fry stated that the FCO was planning to address some of
those shortfalls
but that
those plans required “significant extra funding and depend largely
on the
availability
of suitable senior UK policemen”. MOD activity to support IPS
development
at that
stage comprised:
•
basic
skills training;
•
training of
TSUs (to focus on public order, dangerous criminality and low
level
insurgent
action); and
•
the
provision of military officers to support planning and
co‑ordination at the
Provincial
Joint Operations Centres (PJOCs).
863.
Lt
Gen Fry identified three risks to ISF development in MND(SE)
progressing
ahead of
national development:
•
The ISF in
MND(SE) would not mesh into national Iraqi security
structures.
•
The ISF
would become autonomous and “prone to tribal, political
and
confessional
influences rather than national control”.
•
There may
be a lack of national logistical, equipment, procurement
and
maintenance
structures for them to access.
864.
Lt
Gen Fry suggested that those risks could be mitigated, to some
extent, by UK
advisers in
Iraq’s security Ministries seeking to accelerate the development on
coherent
national
policies and structures and that where possible the UK “should seek
to achieve
a
demonstrable vanguard effect by spreading UK ‘best practice’ in the
development of
ISF to
other areas in Iraq”.
252