6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
{{working
with existing Iraqi structures as far as was consistent with
the
security of
Coalition Forces and the objectives of military
action.
•
Phase IV
Bravo. In the UK’s view, this would begin as soon as there was
a
UN mandated
international civil transitional administration (CTA) in
place,
supported
by UN-mandated Coalition military:
{{With a
UN mandate it would be possible to increase the number
of
countries contributing forces in what could still be an
uncertain
environment.
{{The aim
of Phase IV Bravo would be to transform Iraq “along the lines
of
the
vision”.
{{The UK
was still working with the US on possible elements for the
CTA’s
composition:
“The trick will be to make it sufficiently international
and
UN friendly
to win the support of the UNSC but not to put the UN in
charge
of areas
where it has a poor management track record”.
{{The
duration of Phase IV Bravo would be determined by the time taken
to
draw up a
new constitution and to elect a new government.
•
Phase IV
Charlie. Coalition Forces and the CTA would withdraw, but
Iraq
would
continue to need help restructuring its economy and possibly with
public
administration
more generally.
695.
The FCO letter
to No.10 also enclosed an outline structure for the interim
civil
administration
during Phase IV Bravo, which had already been sent to Lt Gen
Garner.305
The outline
stated:
“Once Iraq
is stabilised and it becomes possible to move to Phase IVb
(recovery),
it would be
desirable to transition the Interim Civil Administrative structure
to a
more
broadly-based structure, authorised by a UN Security Council
resolution. That
would
enable wide international support, and could make the most of
international
experience
without hindering effective leadership.
“The
structure would be headed by a ‘High Representative’ … ideally a
Muslim figure
… Beneath
him would be several co-ordinators heading up vertical pillars
covering
humanitarian
assistance, reconstruction, civil administration and
‘democratisation’.
To assist
him in his task, and until such time as the ‘democratisation’
pillar delivered
appropriate
constitutional reform and a broadly based, representative system,
there
would be an
Iraqi Consultative Council. Working alongside him would be a
security
co-ordinator
who would be responsible for security sector reform and liaison
with the
Coalition
military commander.”
305
Paper
[unattributed and undated], ‘Phase 4b Organization’.
437