The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
18.
The MOD made
provision for civilian support to military operations in Iraq, as
it
would for
any military operation. Military planners identified and drew
attention to the
gap in
those UK civilian capabilities that would be needed for
post-conflict reconstruction
and administration.
19.
Neither the
FCO nor DFID took responsibility for addressing that
gap.
20.
The shortage
of the requisite civilian expertise within government was a
significant
constraint
on the planning and preparation for post-conflict operations and on
the
eventual
scale of the UK civilian contribution.
21.
The review of
the UK’s approach to post-conflict reconstruction, begun in
September
2003,
addressed the management of the UK’s contribution, including “the
identification
and
training of civilian personnel and the maintenance of databases,
with deployable
22.
Although
successive reviews changed significantly the UK’s approach
to
reconstruction
and stabilisation, they had limited impact on the UK’s civilian
deployment
in
Iraq.
23.
The Inquiry
estimates that, on the eve of the invasion, the UK had
between
10 and
16 non-MOD civilians ready to deploy to Iraq. That very small
number reflected
the
assumptions underpinning UK planning and preparation for
post-conflict Iraq,
including that:
•
after a
short period of US-led, UN-authorised military occupation, the UN
would
administer
and provide a framework for the reconstruction of post-conflict
Iraq;
•
substantial
international support would follow UN authorisation;
and
•
reconstruction
and the political transition to Iraqi rule would proceed in a
secure
environment.
24.
Between April
and October 2003, Ministers and officials pressed for an increase
in
the UK
civilian deployments to the US-led Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian
Assistance
(ORHA) and its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), in
Baghdad,
Basra and elsewhere in Iraq.
25.
Government
departments were not equipped to respond to those
demands.
26.
On 17 April,
Mr Blair agreed that the UK should “increase significantly the
level of …
political
and practical support to ORHA, including the secondment of
significant numbers
of staff in
priority areas”.2
1
Letter Owen
to Fergusson, 5 February 2004, ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction: Paper
for the DOP,
12 February’
attaching Paper [unattributed], [undated], ‘Post Conflict
Reconstruction’.
2
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
414