3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
•
“Regional
states would prefer UN inspections to a US-led attack on Iraq.
Such
an attack
would provoke large-scale protests across the Arab world.
Jordan
would be
particularly exposed to internal instability, but the Gulf States
would
also be
nervous. None of Iraq’s neighbours would regret Saddam’s
overthrow
and none
would provide practical … support for Iraq against a US-led
attack.”
•
“There is
consensus among Iraq’s neighbours that its territorial integrity
must be
preserved,
but there are great mutual suspicions and differences over the
place
of the
Kurds and the Shia in any new Iraqi regime, the regime’s nature and
its
relationship
with the West.”8
24.
Key points
from the Assessment are set out in the Box below.
The
Assessment stated:
“Arab
attitudes towards Iraq, and particularly towards any prospective
US-led attack,
are
inextricably linked to bilateral relations with the US, events on
the ground in the
Occupied
Territories and perceived Western ‘double standards’ in favour of
Israel
… We judge
that, in the
present circumstances, even the most pro-Western
Gulf States
[…] would find it politically impossible to support a US-led
attack
on
Iraq. We judge
it unlikely that
the current strong anti-US sentiment will
dissipate
quickly. Only
significant progress towards what the Arab world would
see
as an
equitable resolution of the Palestinian issue would mitigate this.
Even if this
is achieved,
recent events in the West Bank will make it harder in the
medium-term
to win
regional support for military action against Iraq.”
Iraq-related
concerns had “dropped significantly down the Arab agenda” and Iraq
was
“rarely
perceived as the greatest security threat within the region”. The
Gulf States saw
“Iran as
the greater long-term threat and want an Iran-Iraq
balance”.
The
“conjunction of the threat of US military action and the pressure
in the UN to permit
the return
of weapons inspectors” had “led Iraq to pursue a revitalised
foreign policy”.
That had
included:
•
talks with the
UN Secretary-General;
•
several
attempts to win over its neighbours;
•
an Iraqi
declaration at the Arab League Summit on 27 March 2002 that
it
recognised
Kuwait’s sovereignty and independence;
•
a marked
decline in the number of militant attacks on Iran which suggested
that
Iraq had
“at least temporarily restrained the MEK [Mujahideen e Khalq]”;
and
•
an Arab League
resolution that its members would not support an outside
attack
on any
other member.
Iraq’s
neighbours remained “suspicious of its intentions” and were
“focused on
economic gains”.
8
JIC
Assessment, 19 April 2002, ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes’.
7